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Against Administrative Judges
Kent Barnett*
The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by
scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These
Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal
Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in
numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more
numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant
statutory provisions that preserve their impartiality. The national press
has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ
proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use
of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that
ignores more widespread, less independent, and less litigant-protective AJ
adjudication falls woefully short.
This Article argues that, contrary to agency orthodoxy and regardless of
regulated parties’ interests, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs to
further their own interests. With broad direction to choose AJs or ALJs,
agencies prefer the former because of increased control over AJs’ job
performance and policy implementation in flexible, informal proceedings
— all for less cost. Yet, not only are the relative informality and cost
savings of AJ proceedings exaggerated (based on data that this Article is
the first to consider meaningfully), but the use of AJs has overlooked
* Copyright © 2016 Kent Barnett. Assistant Professor, University of Georgia
School of Law. I appreciate extremely valuable comments from Michael Asimow,
Mehrsa Baradaran, Emily Bremer, Aziz Huq, Brian Lea, Jeff Lubbers, Aaron Nielson,
Usha Rodrigues, Miriam Seifter, David Shipley, Hon. J.E. Sullivan, and Chris Walker.
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downsides. Agency control of AJs undermines their perceived impartiality,
creating unacknowledged due process concerns under two recent Supreme
Court decisions — Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. and Free
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB — and complicating agencies’ missions.
Choosing ALJs also increases the likelihood of agencies receiving
deferential judicial review and absolute official immunity for agency
adjudicators. Thus, this Article broadens and contextualizes the current
ALJ controversy by highlighting the more pervasive and problematic
phenomenon of AJs in administrative adjudication.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1645
I. DISTINGUISHING ALJS FROM AJS ............................................. 1652
A. Administrative Law Judges .............................................. 1654
B. Administrative Judges ...................................................... 1656
II. BLACK-TIE OPTIONAL: CHOOSING ALJS OR AJS ...................... 1662
III. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF AJS’ BENEFITS ......................... 1666
A. Control, Expertise, and Efficiency .................................... 1667
B. Purported Lower Costs .................................................... 1669
IV. RULING AGAINST AJS .............................................................. 1670
A. Benefits of Ceding Some Agency Control .......................... 1671
1. Improving the Appearance of Impartiality............... 1671
a. Avoiding a Substantial Due Process Question....... 1671
b. Avoiding Practical Distractions ........................... 1683
2. Increasing Likelihood of Judicial Deference ............ 1686
3. Increasing Likelihood of Absolute Official
Immunity .................................................................. 1690
B. Exaggerated Benefits of Choosing AJs .............................. 1693
1. Overstated Cost Savings ........................................... 1693
2. Overstated Informality and Efficiency ..................... 1698
3. Overstated Expertise ................................................ 1702
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 1708
APPENDIX A. GRADES GS-15 OR ABOVE ............................................. 1709
APPENDIX B. ISOLATED HIGH-PAID AJS ............................................. 1714
APPENDIX C. ISOLATED LOW-PAID AJS .............................................. 1716

2016]

Against Administrative Judges

1645

INTRODUCTION
Federal administrative adjudicators — Administrative Law Judges
(“ALJs”) and their doppelgängers Administrative Judges (“AJs”) —
comprise the “hidden judiciary.”1 Despite numbers and caseloads
substantially larger than Article III courts’, ALJs and AJs mostly go
about unnoticed, toiling in the shadows of agency rulemaking.2
Scholarly attention to agency adjudication has, at best, been fleeting.3
ALJs have, however, recently done something uncharacteristic: they
got the national media’s attention — but not in a good way. The New
York Times and The Wall Street Journal have reported that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) prevails much more
frequently — sometimes 100% of the time in a given year — in its inhouse enforcement proceedings than in court.4 Whether or not
selection effects impact those statistics’ validity,5 parties subject to
1 See Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1478 (2009).
2 Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch
Way, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409 (2013) (“Administrative adjudication as a
whole gets much less attention in modern scholarship than rulemaking does.”).
3 Scholars last gave agency adjudication a sustained look in the early 1990s. See,
e.g., 2 PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 1058 (1992); John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the
Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and
Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (1990) [hereinafter Political Control]; Paul R. Verkuil,
Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1992)
[hereinafter Reflections]. In the past ten years, agency adjudication has only
occasionally returned to meaningful scholarly discussion. See, e.g., Kent Barnett,
Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013) [hereinafter Resolving the ALJ
Quandary]; Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 693 (2005) [hereinafter Policymaking]; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative
Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191 (2006); Bijal Shah,
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015).
4 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [hereinafter
SEC Wins]; Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-ofhome-court-edge.html (contrasting SEC’s 88% win rate in ALJ hearings to its 63% win rate
in district courts). For instance, the SEC prevailed in all agency proceedings in 2012, and
in more than 75% in 2011, 2013, and 2014. In comparison, it prevailed in less than 75% of
similar judicial proceedings. See id.
5 Perhaps the SEC prevails more often in its in-house tribunals because it is
sending easier cases there rather than to federal court. See, e.g., Stephen Joyce, Rakoff,
Practitioners Question SEC Practice of Sending More Enforcement Cases to ALJs,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.bna.com/rakoff-practitioners-questionn17179923714/; infra Part IV.A.2.
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these increasingly frequent proceedings have taken note.6 In several
recent judicial proceedings, they have challenged — and have had
enjoined7 — those SEC administrative proceedings on separation-ofpowers grounds, complained of the limited protections and
procedures that those proceedings afford them, and emphasized the
partiality concerns that arise from the SEC’s higher win rate before its
own judges than before Article III courts.8
When responding to the partiality concerns (and a disruptive
attempt to depose an ALJ), the SEC did something very curious. It
invited the ALJ at issue to file an affidavit to declare whether he had
felt undue pressure from the SEC to rule in the agency’s favor.9 The
ALJ declined to do so,10 creating an unfavorable impression of
impinged independence. A former ALJ’s recent allegations that she
came under fire for ruling against the SEC only magnified this
impression.11
What the public and even many lawyers may not realize is that this
high-profile indictment of the SEC’s in-house proceedings implicates
the most formal, most litigant-protective form of federal agency
adjudication — so-called “formal adjudication” under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).12 Numerous, if not most,
6 See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-tojudges-it-appoints-1413849590 (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC’s antiforeign-corruption enforcement unit).
7 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320-21 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (granting
preliminary injunction based on substantial likelihood of Appointments Clause
violation); accord Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357, 2015 WL 4940083, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015).
8 See, e.g., Gray Fin. Group, Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00492-LMM (N.D. Ga. Aug.
4, 2015); Timbervest v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Tilton
v. SEC, No. 15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1304;
Stilwell v. SEC, No. 14-cv-7931 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014).
9 Timbervest, LLC, SEC File No. 3-15519 (June 4, 2015), available at
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2015/ia-4103.pdf.
10 Cara Salvatore, SEC Judge Refuses to Say Whether He Favors Agency, LAW360
(June 12, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/667248/sec-judge-refuses-to-saywhether-he-favors-agency.
11 See Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 4 (referring to former SEC ALJ Lillian
McEwen, who complained of coming “under fire” for finding in favor of regulated
parties).
12 The SEC’s enforcement proceedings are required to be “on the record, after
notice and opportunity for hearing,” when it seeks to impose a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h–1(g)(1) (2012). That phrase serves as triggering language under the APA to
require formal adjudication protections. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). Those
protections include requiring an ALJ to preside (in the absence of the agency or its
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agency adjudications — more than 550,000 annually13 — are less
formal than those formal SEC proceedings. And, most importantly for
this Article, these informal proceedings are overseen by mere AJs,
agency employees whose number is likely twice as large as ALJs.14
Agencies across the federal administrative state use AJs, but AJs are
most prevalent in the Department of Commerce (with more than
1,000 AJs), the Internal Revenue Service (950), the Department of
Veterans Affairs (306), the Department of Justice (250), and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (111).15 ALJs and AJs perform
the same function: they preside over oral hearings to award benefits
and licenses, enforce agency penalties, and adjudicate claims primarily
between private parties. Indeed, some agencies use both ALJs and AJs
to hear the exact same kinds of cases, including federal employment
cases before the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).16
Despite sharing nearly identical titles and functions with ALJs, AJs
lack the statutory protection from removal, professional discipline,
and performance reviews that ALJs have under the APA.17 Relatedly,
agencies directly hire AJs, while another independent agency, the
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), oversees ALJ hiring.
Unlike ALJs, AJs can (and often do) carry out other duties for the
agency when not presiding over hearings. Perhaps most unsettling, no
statute prohibits them from communicating ex parte with agency
officials during and about their hearings.18 These distinctions provide
agencies more control over AJs than ALJs (and, reflexively, AJs less
independence than ALJs). Despite their widespread use and obvious
lack of independence, AJs’ understandable confusion with betterknown ALJs means that they are “the real hidden judiciary.”19

members), see id. § 556(b) (2012), limiting ex parte communications, and limiting the
ALJs’ functions within the agency, see id. § 554(d).
13 RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY THEN AND NOW — A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, app. C (2002). Limon’s
data from 2002 is the most recent data of which I am aware concerning AJs and their
proceedings. I am not aware of any data (contemporary to data concerning the
number of AJ proceedings) for ALJs. For limited, dated numbers, see infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
15 See LIMON, supra note 13, at app. C (“2002 Top Ten List of Non-ALJs by
Agency”).
16 See infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part I.B.
18 See infra Part I.
19 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345.
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The key problem with all agency hearings — whether with an ALJ
or AJ — is that they create inherent partiality concerns. The
adjudicator’s employing agency is often a party and controls the
adjudicator’s budget and perhaps salary. Indeed, the agency may even
present expert witnesses who are the adjudicator’s own co-workers.20
Congress sought to address these concerns in the APA for ALJs by
giving ALJs independence based on their hiring, removal, oversight,
and limited interactions with agency officials.21 Yet even with the
APA’s many ALJ-independence measures, scholars have questioned
ALJs’ appearance of partiality for decades, coming to different
conclusions as to whether ALJs violate due process.22 But Congress
has not given AJs any of these indicia of independence, even after the
well-publicized partisan hiring and firing of Immigration Judges (a
type of AJ) during the George W. Bush Administration.23 Yet if, as the
recent SEC example and past scholarship reveal, the federal
government’s most formal form of adjudication with its most
independent agency judges (ALJs) is problematic,24 the use of less
independent AJs in less litigant-protective proceedings is even more
troubling. Any solutions that focus only on ALJs are myopic because
more significant and pernicious problems surround AJs. This Article
tackles AJs’ place in the administrative state and thereby agency
adjudication much more broadly.

20

Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1195.
See infra notes 219, 221 and accompanying text. Congress has also given certain
AJs — Board of Contracts Appeals Judges — some or all of the protections that ALJs
have. For instance, all of those judges must be appointed like ALJs from a register by
the hiring agency. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2), (d)(2) (2012); VERKUIL
ET AL., supra note 3, at 950-51. One group also has the same protection from at-will
removal that ALJs share. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (no protection from at-will removal
for Armed Services Board Judges); id. § 7105(b)(3) (same protection as ALJs from atwill removal for Civil Board of Contract Appeals Judge); id. § 7105(c) (no protection
for Tennessee Valley Authority Board Judges), (d) (no protection from at-will removal
for Postal Service Board Judges).
22 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 817-20 (summarizing
due-process debates surrounding ALJs).
23 See, e.g., Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 380-81 (2008) (citing Carol Marin,
Patronage “Crime” Does Pay — for Justice Dept., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at B6);
Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties,
WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html.
24 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 816-20 (discussing
impartiality debates surrounding ALJs in legal scholarship).
21
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Agencies, largely ignoring the partiality question, have increasingly
chosen AJs to preside over oral hearings for several ostensible reasons.
Proponents argue that agencies can use AJs to oversee less important,
more flexible, and more efficient proceedings than the formal
proceedings that the APA requires ALJs to oversee.25 AJs, too, are
likely to provide more subject-matter and policy expertise than ALJs
because they come from within the agency and often are working on
other agency projects.26 Unlike with ALJs, agencies face no statutory
impediment to controlling AJs’ appointment, job performance, or
termination. And agencies can obtain all of these indicia of control
over AJs at a lower cost because AJs’ salaries are purportedly cheaper
than ALJs’. Because of these benefits, the conventional wisdom holds
that agencies will and should — from their vantage point — choose
AJs and informal adjudication over ALJs and formal adjudication.27
But this Article identifies two examples to demonstrate that the choice
is not inevitable28 and, at any rate, argues that agencies’ significant
preference for AJs over ALJs has it backwards.
Agencies’ control over AJs and purported cost savings exact a
significant price for three reasons. First and foremost, AJs suffer from
even more partiality concerns than ALJs because they lack ALJs’ more
rigorous appointment process led by an outside agency and ALJs’
statutory protections from oversight and removal. This is a significant
problem for regulated parties and agencies because, in light of one of
the Supreme Court’s most recent impartiality decisions (Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co.29) and one of its most recent separation-ofpowers decisions (Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB30), there is a
25 See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009
(2004) (“[Formal adjudication with ALJs] interferes with an agency’s ability to
manage its adjudicatory function and increases an agency’s costs of conducting
adjudication.”); Frye, supra note 3, at 268 (discussing agencies’ view that informality
improves agency control and efficiency of achieving policy goals that Congress has set
for the agency).
26 See Frye, supra note 3, at 350-51 (noting that of the 2,692 AJs reported in the
1992 Frye Survey, more than 2,000 (including those who do not work for agencies)
perform other tasks for the agency or employer); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial
Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, app. I
(2007) (“In addition to the ALJs, there are many other administrative judges who are
chosen and appointed within the agencies to positions that may not be full-time or
permanent.”).
27 See infra Part III.
28 See infra Part II.
29 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
30 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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compelling, unacknowledged argument that agency control over AJs
creates an unconstitutional appearance of partiality under the Due
Process Clause and thereby renders invalid tainted agency
proceedings. Moreover, even without a due process violation, the
perception of partiality — as the SEC’s current litigation demonstrates
— leads to wholesale resistance from regulated parties and perhaps
even courts (as partiality concerns over Immigration Judges did in the
mid-2000s) and Congress for agency initiatives. Second, using AJs,
instead of ALJs and formal adjudication, decreases the likelihood
under current doctrine that agencies will receive deference from courts
(under administrative law’s well-known Chevron doctrine) when they
interpret statutes that they administer. Third, using AJs, instead of
ALJs, is less likely to limit onerous agency litigation because the latter
receive absolute official immunity as a matter of course, while the
former must satisfy an uncertain, open-ended inquiry.
Aside from the perils of agency control over AJs, the other benefits for
AJs — cost savings, informality, and better expertise — are exaggerated.
The cost savings of using AJs is not as significant as it may first appear
because approximately half of all AJs make more than, the same as, or
almost as much as ALJs.31 Even when assuming the greatest (and
unrealistic) pay differential between ALJs and the remaining AJs, the
cost savings is small — almost always less than $3 million per agency
(out of multi-million- or multi-billion-dollar budgets). Likewise, the
value of informality is also overstated. Many AJ proceedings are
relatively formal already, and formal adjudication with ALJs under the
APA provides more flexibility than its name suggests, leaving only an
extremely small number of cases in which formal adjudication would be
ill-suited.32 Finally, significant technical expertise is not always
necessary for agency adjudication. But when it is, the administrative
state can allow agencies to consider expertise when hiring ALJs, while
mitigating concerns that agencies will hire only their own employees
with certain biases. In short, agencies have overstated the benefits and
understated the costs of choosing AJs over ALJs.33
The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, it seeks to highlight
and contextualize the often-forgotten hearing officers who preside
over hundreds of thousands of federal adjudications. Second, it seeks
to convince agencies that they should not accept the seemingly
intuitive benefits of using AJs without much deeper consideration,
31

See infra Part IV.B.1.
But even these few proceedings should have AJs with increased indicia of
independence for the reasons provided infra Part IV.
33 See infra Part IV.
32
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especially in light of new doctrine since the early 1990s when informal
adjudication received its last meaningful glance from scholars. Third,
it seeks to reorient the largely forgotten discussion of AJs from the
1990s by shifting the focus from when Congress should require the use
of ALJs for the sake of regulated parties34 to how agencies themselves
have discretion and incentive to choose AJs or, when necessary, seek
congressional authorization to do so.
Two caveats apply. First, this Article does not take a view on when
an oral hearing is necessary or appropriate.35 Instead, this Article
addresses whether ALJs and statutory formalities better serve agency
interests once Congress or an agency has determined that one is
needed. Second, it does not address how ALJs and formal proceedings
could be further improved to avoid the SEC’s predicament. Notably,
ALJs provide no panacea. But I have considered that question, in part,
elsewhere,36 and its full treatment requires more space than this
Article permits.
With these goals and limitations in mind, this Article proceeds as
follows. Part I distinguishes ALJs from AJs, concentrating on their
appointment, removal, and protections from agency influence and
control. Part II considers agencies’ significant discretion in choosing
who presides over agency hearings, and Part III describes why
agencies have reflexively chosen AJs over ALJs. Part IV argues that
agencies should choose ALJs over AJs to further agencies’ own
interests by highlighting the overlooked costs of controlling AJs, the
benefits of ALJs, and the overstated arguments for AJs.

34 See, e.g., VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058 (“Congress should consider
expanding the category of cases where ALJs are required . . . .”).
35 For a leading discussion of when informal adjudication proceedings satisfy due
process, see Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 739, 779-93 (1976) [hereinafter Informal Adjudication]. Scholars have also more
recently reconsidered the virtues of formal administrative proceedings. See also, e.g.,
William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
881, 884 (2006) [hereinafter Wong Yang Sung] (reconsidering the viability of early
Supreme Court decision evaluating when Congress requires formal adjudication “on
the record” under the APA); Aaron Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 237, 292 (2014) (calling for agencies and Congress to reevaluate the benefits
of formal rulemaking with oral hearings).
36 See generally Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3 (identifying
three constitutional and practical concerns that surround ALJs and arguing that ALJs’
appointment and removal by the D.C. Circuit would largely mitigate those concerns).
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DISTINGUISHING ALJS FROM AJS

ALJs and AJs outnumber and handle a substantially larger caseload
than Article III judges. Although there are 860 permanently
authorized Article III judgeships as of 2014,37 there are more than
1,500 ALJs38 and, based on the latest data from 2002, more than 3,300
AJs.39 Along with their substantially greater numbers, ALJs and AJs
decide a large number of cases, likely more than federal courts. Based
on historical data, AJs and ALJs together likely preside, at the least,
over more than 750,000 proceedings annually.40 For comparison’s
sake, federal district courts had only about 375,000 civil and criminalfelony case filings in 2015.41
ALJs and AJs perform the same kinds of duties as their Article III
analogues, although those duties vary by agency or proceeding.42 In
general, they preside over hearings, admit evidence and compile a
record of the proceedings, make credibility determinations, and issue
initial opinions.43 They also often have authority to assess monetary
penalties44 or revoke valuable licenses45 or security clearances.46 Aside
from or while adjudicating factual disputes, they also make social
policy by interpreting statutes, agency regulations, and agency
37 Authorized Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/
authorized-judgeships (last visited July 11, 2015) (click “Authorized JudgeshipsFrom 1789 to Present”).
38 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
39 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
40 LIMON, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that AJs presided over approximately
393,000 proceedings in 1992); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1346 n.18 (noting
that ALJs decided over 250,000 cases in 1990).
41 See Table N/A — U.S. District Courts — Combined Civil and Criminal Federal
Court Management Statistics, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts.
gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2015/03/31-2.
42 For empirical data from the early 1990s concerning the kinds of proceedings
and matters that AJs oversee and consider, see Frye, supra note 3, at 263-69.
43 See Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco — A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71
(1979); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345.
44 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1(g) (2012) (permitting ALJs to award civil penalties
in SEC enforcement proceedings); Frye, supra note 3, at 283 (discussing informal
adjudications in Coast Guard); id. at 287 n.65 (discussing certain informal EPA and
FDIC enforcement proceedings).
45 See, e.g., Frye, supra note 3, at 287 n.65 (discussing license-revocation
proceedings by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms); id. at 308-14
(considering administrative cases in which the remedies or licensing apparatuses
primarily benefit private parties).
46 See id. at 279-80 (discussing security-clearance revocation hearings by the
Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review).
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guidance documents47 and by compiling a record necessary to support
policy decisions.48
The hearings that they oversee may concern exceedingly similar
subject matters. For instance, both ALJs and AJs award entitlement
benefits. ALJs award social-security benefits, while AJs award veterans
benefits.49 Likewise, ALJs preside over MSPB disciplinary hearings
concerning other ALJs, but AJs oversee those same hearings for all
other federal employees.50
Unsurprisingly, because of AJs’ and ALJs’ shared functions, similar
hearings, and nearly identical titles and acronyms, they are frequently
confused with one another or treated as if they are nearly
synonymous. Some scholars consciously group them together when
addressing concerns about administrative adjudication generally.51
Others seem to group them together inadvertently, although
understandably.52 Yet, as compared to their functional similarities, AJs
and ALJs differ in ways that are less obvious to litigants: their number
and potential employers, appointment, removal, and ability to resist
agency oversight.

47 See Charles Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy, 68
LA. L. REV. 1095, 1100-01 (2008) (explaining how administrative judges’
interpretations can aid in the development of rules and policy).
48 See id. at 1099 (“[Adjudicators’ ability to develop the record] is one of the ways
administrative adjudication is superior to other forms, especially in confronting policy
issues. Administrative judges must ensure that the record contains the necessary
technical and other policy oriented information, what administrative law defines as
‘legislative facts.’”); see also id. at 1102-03 (“Administrative judges serve the policymaking function as both record builders and initial decision-makers. . . . The agency
must develop policy that carries forward the intent of the statute, and administrative
judges should contribute to that policy development.”).
49 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92–7: THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 3 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 ACUS RPT.], available at
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/92-7.pdf.
50 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1352 n.47 (noting that Congress
specifically permitted the use of AJs, except in hearings concerning ALJs).
51 See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 701 n.40.
52 Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3
WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 215 n.207 (2012) [hereinafter Blowing in the Wind]
(citing an article in a leading law journal that purported to examine bias in
“administrative law judges,” but referred to U.S. Department of Labor statistics that
grouped “administrative law judges, adjudicators, and hearing officers” together).
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A. Administrative Law Judges
As of 2010, there were nearly 1,600 federal ALJs, more than 1,300 of
whom work for the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).53 Their
positions are established by statute.54 Agencies may appoint them55 but
only after the OPM has winnowed a list of candidates. ALJ candidates
must be licensed attorneys, have seven years’ litigation experience in
courts or administrative agencies (but not necessarily in matters
related to the hiring agency), and pass an examination that the OPM
administers.56 The OPM then ranks candidates based on examination
scores, experience,57 and veteran status.58 The OPM then prepares,
under what is known as the “Rule of Three,” a list of the three highestscoring candidates from which the appointing agency can select its
ALJ.59 The goal of this OPM-led process is to render the appointments
nonpolitical.60 To obtain more control over the appointment process,
agencies often hire ALJs who already work in another agency,61 or
they can wait until several vacancies exist to obtain a larger register of
candidates.62 Agencies may also borrow an ALJ from another agency
with that agency’s consent.63

53 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 586 app. C (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the OPM informed the Court that there were 1,584 federal
ALJs, 1,334 of whom work for the SSA).
54 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
55 Id. (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556
and 557 of this title.”).
56 VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN
OVERVIEW 2 (2010).
57 Id.
58 Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2015).
For a discussion on the significant impact of the controversial veterans’ preference on
the final list of ALJ candidates, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law
Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115-16 (1981)
[hereinafter Federal Administrative Law Judges]. The Administrative Conference of the
United States has recommended repeatedly that Congress modify the preference
because it further limits agencies in hiring candidates with relevant skills or expertise.
See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 6.
59 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 2-3. The OPM’s scoring formulation for veterans
led to protracted litigation and the suspension of ALJ hiring for four years. See Meeker
v. M.S.P.B., 319 F.3d 1368, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003); BURROWS, supra note 56, at 3.
60 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344.
61 See id. at 1361 n.82.
62 See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 5.
63 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012).
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After their appointment, ALJs have some statutory protection from
agency oversight to protect their decisional independence. ALJs
oversee rulemaking or adjudicatory hearings that Congress requires to
be “on the record.”64 This on-the-record phrase triggers “formal
adjudication,” as it is colloquially known,65 with certain rights and
protections under the APA.66 One of the key characteristics of formal
hearings is that the agency heads67 or an ALJ must preside.68 When an
ALJ presides (as is almost always the case69), the APA requires a
separation of functions for ALJs, meaning that they cannot perform
investigative or prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who
does.70 They also generally cannot have ex parte contacts (including
with agency officials) concerning a fact at issue.71 But heads of
agencies can still set agency policy by reversing ALJs’ decisions in full,
as to both fact and law.72
ALJs, too, have significant protection from performance reviews.
They are exempt from the Civil Service Reform Act’s performance
appraisal requirements, which apply to most federal employees.73
Their pay is set by statute and OPM regulation, not tied to
performance reviews.74 Agencies also cannot reward ALJs with
64 Id. § 553(c) (2012) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a) (2012) (adjudication). There is a
longstanding debate over whether the SSA, which uses ALJs for its hearings, is
required to engage in formal adjudication for its hearings. See Social Security
Subcommittee House Ways and Means Committee 4-5 (June 27, 2012) (statement of
Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers); Robin J. Arzt, Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges
Pursuant to the Social Security Act Are Adjudications Pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 279, 281-82 (2002) [hereinafter
Adjudications]. One of the SSA’s ALJs has asserted that ALJs are permitted to oversee
only formal proceedings. See id.
65 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1005-06 (noting that some “informal” proceedings
can be equally as “formal” as those that are not governed by the APA’s on-the-record
requirements).
66 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2012).
67 Id. § 556(b)(1)–(2) (permitting an agency head or members of a multi-member
body to preside).
68 Id. § 556(b)(3).
69 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1005 n.11 (“The APA also permits the agency head
or heads to preside at hearings instead of ALJs (although this almost never
happens).”).
70 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105 (2012); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991) (describing separation of
functions for ALJs).
71 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1).
72 Id. § 557(b) (2012); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951).
73 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 2.
74 Id.; see also Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the
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bonuses.75 Agencies do have some authority to implement qualitycontrol mechanisms to improve efficiency and accuracy in the
adjudicative process.76 Yet, despite some scholarly support,77 these
mechanisms have proven controversial and of limited use in removing
less productive ALJs.78
Agencies, too, have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove
ALJs. They may generally discipline or remove ALJs only for “good
cause established and determined by the [MSPB]” after a formal
administrative hearing.79 The MSPB members, like ALJs, also enjoy
protection from removal because the President can remove them “only
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”80 Otherwise,
ALJs essentially have life tenure because they do not serve for a period
of years in office.81 That said, ALJs are quick to note that agencies have
sought to remove more than twenty ALJs since 1946, and the SSA —
which employs most ALJs — has sought to obtain authority to
“discipline” ALJs for “offenses” without prior findings by the MSPB.82
B. Administrative Judges
With ALJs’ place in the administrative firmament in mind, the
differences between AJs and ALJs become readily apparent. But as an
initial admonition, one key reason that AJs remain the most unknown
Executive Branch, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1108 (2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 4301
(2012)). ALJs’ pay is set out in significant detail in 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012), with three
levels of basic pay. Notably, Congress moved from a two-tiered pay grade for ALJs —
which was supposed to account for the difficulty of the kinds of cases that ALJs heard,
see Scalia, supra note 43, at 65-67, and raised their pay. See Verkuil, Reflections, supra
note 3, at 1352.
75 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.210(b) (2015) (OPM regulation).
76 See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 405-06 (7th Cir. 2015)
(holding that ALJs could not assert a claim to invalidate the SSA’s current 500decision “goal” under the APA, but instead had to seek relief under the Civil Service
Reform Act); Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding SSA’s
implementation of “reasonable production goals”).
77 See Pierce, Political Control, supra note 3, at 506.
78 See Colvin, 777 F.3d at 402 (ALJ Association challenging SSA’s disposition
“goals”); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984) (refusing to remove
ALJ with productivity rate more than 50% below agency average of monthly case
dispositions). For a thorough discussion of productivity-related actions against ALJs,
see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate
System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994).
79 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
80 Id. § 1202(d) (2012).
81 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344.
82 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 808.
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of the “hidden judiciary” is that the data for AJs, as compared to ALJs
is much more limited, dated, and inconsistent from survey to survey.
Because the government does not regularly collect data on AJs,
surveyors must “go directly to the employing agencies.”83
Most of the data in this Article comes from either a 1992 survey
collected by Administrative Law Judge John Frye concerning AJs
(hereinafter, 1992 Frye Survey)84 or a 2002 (and most recent) update
by Raymond Limon, then Acting Assistant Deputy Director at the
OPM’s Office of Administrative Law Judges (hereinafter, Limon
Updated Survey).85 These surveys asked numerous agencies similar
questions about the number of AJs who preside over oral hearings,
AJs’ titles, AJs’ pay grade or scale, how agencies review AJs’
performance (if at all), and types of cases that AJs hear.86 But, likely
because of statutory changes or responding agencies’ differing
interpretations of the questions asked, responses from the agencies to
these similar questions, at times, provided disparate answers. For
instance, the respondents appear to have interpreted who qualified as
a “non-ALJ” or what qualified as an “oral hearing” differently. The
1992 Frye Survey reports Veterans Affairs (“VA”) regional
administrators as the largest group of federal AJs, but the VA did not
include them in its response in the Limon Updated Survey.87 Likewise,
the Limon Updated Survey reported that the Commerce and Treasury
departments housed the most AJs with 1,000 patent examiners and
950 IRS AJs, respectively, but neither appeared to count these
positions in the 1992 Frye Survey.88 Moreover, some agencies
responded to one study but not the other.89 Unless identified
otherwise, I rely upon the Limon Updated Survey data because it is
more recent, was sent to more agencies,90 and received more
responses.91
83

LIMON, supra note 13, at app. B n.1.
See generally Frye, supra note 3.
85 See generally LIMON, supra note 13.
86 See id. app. B (“2002 Survey Questions of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs”); Frye,
supra note 3, app. A, at 348 (“Study of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs”).
87 Compare Frye, supra note 3, app. B at 351 (listing 1,692 VA AJs), with LIMON,
supra note 13, app. C, at 6 (listing total number of 306 AJs at the VA).
88 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1, 6 (listing total number of 1,097 AJs at
Commerce and 950 at Treasury), with Frye, supra note 3, app. B, at 349-51 (listing 58
AJs for Commerce (including the Board of Patent Appeals) and 21 for Treasury AJs).
89 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that surveys were sent to “over 80
Federal agencies”) & app. C (listing agencies that responded to surveys), with Frye,
supra note 3, app. A at 347 (listing surveyed agencies and those that responded).
90 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 (“[W]e eventually contacted over 80
84
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These concerns with the data’s validity are important to keep in
mind, but they affect my analysis in only one minor way. The data’s
primary purpose is to establish the general widespread use and variety
of AJs. I have no reason to think that more contemporary data, other
than revealing more use and variety of AJs, would undermine these
descriptive points. Any specific data is largely irrelevant to my key
points concerning partiality, formality, or expertise. The only area that
the data’s limitations may slightly impact my conclusions is in the
magnitude of cost savings from using AJs. Because the number of AJs
is probably greater now than in 2002, the cost savings may be slightly
greater than I indicate in Part IV.B.1. Nonetheless, it is extremely
likely that my larger point — that the cost savings are not as large as
they first appear based on AJs’ various salaries and agencies’ relative
budgets — continues to be true, and I attempted to address concerns
over the data’s limits by assuming the best case for agencies’ cost
savings when interpreting the most current data.
From the existing data, AJs and ALJs differ in number and potential
employers. Based on the most recent data, the number of AJs is likely
more than double that of ALJs.92 The Limon Updated Survey reveals
that of the reported 3,370 AJs in 2002, almost one-third worked for
the Department of Commerce, most as patent examiners.93 The next
largest category from the Limon Updated Report is 950 AJs for the
Internal Revenue Service.94 In the 1992 Frye Survey (but not included

Federal agencies and offices . . . .”), with Frye, supra note 3, app. A (listing 48 agencies
to which surveys were sent).
91 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, app. C (listing 65 agencies responding and 36
indicating that they administered responsive hearings), with Frye, supra note 3, app. A
(listing 47 agencies as responding and 35 indicating that they administered responsive
hearings). The 1992 Frye Study is helpful, however, in describing how AJs frequently
engage in more activities than adjudication and in identifying how some AJs are not
government employees. See id. app. B.
92 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345-46 (noting, in 1989, that 2,600 AJs
worked for the federal government fulltime or part-time, rendering the corps of AJs
“about twice as large as the ALJ corps . . . [with] a decision load that is at least the
magnitude of that carried by the ALJs”); Frye, supra note 3, at 270 n.20 (noting that
there were “601 presiding officers without other duties . . . [and] some 2,262
presiding officers with other duties, including those who are not government
employees”). Limon also reported 1,351 ALJs in 2002. LIMON, supra note 13, at 3 n.4.
93 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1 & “2002 Top Ten List of Non-ALJs by
Agency” Chart.
94 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 6. The 1992 Frye Survey did not include
these IRS AJs. See Frye, supra note 3, app. B, at 349-51 (reporting only 21 AJs for the
Department of Treasury).
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in the Limon Updated Survey95), the second largest group of AJs is
comprised of privately employed hearing officers who adjudicate
certain Medicare disputes that health insurers administer for the
government.96 These 185 AJs reveal a key difference between some AJs
and ALJs. Unlike all ALJs, these Medicare hearing officers are part of a
slightly larger group of 237 AJs, as reported in 1992, who are
employed by private parties, not government agencies.97
Insurance-carrier “hearing officers” reveal another, and much less
appreciated, difference between ALJs and AJs: the nature of their titles
is not the same. “Administrative Law Judge” is a statutory term, as
indicated above, that applies to those OPM-approved adjudicators who
have statutory protections and preside over formal adjudication.98 AJs,
in contrast, can, but rarely do, have a statutorily provided title. For
example, Congress expressly used the term “administrative judge” in
describing the initial adjudicators of certain civil-penalty hearings
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty99 and adverse actions
concerning senior executives within the VA.100 Congress also provides
similar titles, such as “Immigration Judges,” defined as those
“attorney[s] whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative
judge within the Executive Office of Immigration Review.”101 Much
more frequently, however, the agency establishes the term by
regulation.102 In yet other instances, “AJ” or “administrative judge” is a
95 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 3 (not listing Carrier Hearing Officers
under entry for “U.S. Department of Health & Human Services”).
96 See Frye, supra note 3, at 291, app. B, at 349-52.
97 See id. at 351-52. The Limon Updated Survey does not appear to include
privately employed AJs, aside from a response from the Administrative Office of the
Courts, which indicated that it uses AJs on a contractual basis and listed the pay plan
as “N/A.” See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1. For this reason, I generally limit my
discussion to government-employed AJs.
98 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 n.2 (“[O]nly ALJs appointed under 5 U.S.C. 3105
may be given the title of ALJ.”).
99 See 22 U.S.C. § 8142(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
100 38 U.S.C. § 713(e) (2012) (removal of senior executives within Department of
Veterans Affairs). The U.S. Code makes a few other references to “administrative
judges.” See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–6(h)(2), 450f(e)(2)(B) (2012) (relating to
hearings concerning, respectively, funding for Indian-health programs and Indiantribe self-determination agreements).
101 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012).
102 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 n.2 (“Generally, individual agencies may create
their own job titles for personnel, budget and fiscal purposes.”); see also, e.g., 29
C.F.R. § 1614.109(a) (2015) (permitting the EEOC to appoint “administrative
judge[s]” to conduct hearings); 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(a)–(b) (2015) (requiring
appointment of an “Administrative Judge” for certain Department of Energy hearings);
12 C.F.R. § 268.108 (2015) (having General Counsel of the Department of Defense
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catch-all term that scholars use to describe those who oversee agency
hearings (sometimes including ALJs103),104 whatever their title.105 For
my purposes, I use the term “AJ” to refer to all non-ALJs who oversee
oral hearings.
Agencies appoint agency-employed AJs without any outside agency’s
(such as the OPM’s) involvement in the selection process.106 Agencies
often have established guidelines for selecting AJs as part of a
competitive process for AJs who have no other duties.107 For instance,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that hearing examiners
“shall be from a list of qualified attorneys possessing the highest
degree of integrity, ability, and good judgment”; have certain
authorization; be employed by the agency, or one of its licensees or
contractors that are not parties to the hearing; have no ex parte
knowledge of the proceedings; and otherwise be impartial.108 But
agencies are not generally required by any statute or the U.S.
Constitution to be appointed in a particular way or to have any
particular qualifications (such as being a lawyer109), aside from Civil
Service statutes that apply to hiring generally.110 Indeed, the Bush
administration came under fire for appointing Immigration Judges
(“IJs”) — a category of AJs — based on political criteria, instead of
under a competitive process.111 Half of the 37 hired IJs had no
appoint “attorneys to be Administrative Judges assigned to the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and DOHA Appeal Board”).
103 See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 701 n.40 (noting distinction between
ALJs and AJs under federal statutory law but “adopt[ing] ‘administrative judge’ as a
universal term” for his article).
104 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 1; Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1342
(“The second category is far more amorphous, but can still be distinguished from
‘non-hearing’ deciders. The deciders in this category are frequently called
‘administrative judges’ or ‘hearing examiners.’”).
105 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 10.26 (2015) (permitting the appointment of a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission “Hearing Examiner” from qualified list of attorneys); 33
C.F.R. § 1.07-15 (2015) (referring to Coast Guard “hearing officers”).
106 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“The selection and appointment
procedures for administrative judges are controlled by the agencies themselves.”).
107 See Frye, supra note 3, at 272. Frye notes that some of the respondents to his
survey appeared to interpret his question as one concerning how employees are hired
generally. See id. (describing AJs with no other duties); id. at 274 (describing AJs with
other duties).
108 See 10 C.F.R. § 10.26 (2015).
109 The Limon Updated Survey indicates that 2,000 of the 3,370 AJs are not
attorneys. See LIMON, supra note 13, at 4; see also Frye, supra note 3, app. B
(identifying AJs who are and are not lawyers).
110 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2302 (2012).
111 See Susan Benesch, Due Process and Decisionmaking in U.S. Immigration
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immigration experience, and those with experience had all worked in
enforcement or as prosecutor.112 And because many AJs have
additional duties aside from presiding over hearings,113 agencies may
have a freer and less visible hand in selecting employees to serve as
part-time adjudicators.
Once appointed, AJs have less independence than ALJs from their
agency-employers. Unlike ALJs, most AJs (83%) are subject to
performance appraisals within the agency,114 and “several major
groups of AJs [regularly] undergo such appraisals.”115 Those appraisals
can affect their salaries, which can be less than ALJs.116 No statute
prohibits them, unlike ALJs, from receiving pay bonuses from their
agencies. Also unlike ALJs, AJs are not entitled to any particular
protection from removal from office (such as ALJs’ “good cause”
standard of removal).117 Hidden, subtle pressures on AJs to rule in
certain ways — to obtain favorable agency appraisals — often go
unremarked.118
Agencies may also have a greater ability to influence AJ proceedings
directly. Unlike ALJs who oversee formal proceedings under the APA,
AJs typically preside over hearings that the APA minimally
regulates.119 In these proceedings (often referred to as “informal”
adjudications), the APA’s prohibitions concerning separation of
Adjudication, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 557, 566 (2007). “An immigration judge is ‘an
attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the
Executive Office for Immigration Review.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4). The [OPM] has
categorized career attorney positions as Schedule A. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102. All IJs are
career Schedule A appointees. Consequently, the civil service laws set forth at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 2301 and 2302 apply to the appointment of IJs.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER
STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008), available at
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/chapter6.htm.
112 See Benesch, supra note 111, at 566.
113 See Frye, supra note 3, at 274 (noting lack of information on how presiding
officers with other duties were selected to be arbitrators).
114 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 4.
115 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 2.
116 See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 215. See discussion infra
Part IV.B.1 for more detailed discussion of salaries.
117 See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 217 (referring to IJs and
MSPB AJs) (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Closing Remarks, Holes in the Fence: Immigration
Reform and Border Security in the United States, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 621, 627 (2007)).
118 See, e.g., id. at 217-23 (arguing that MSPB AJs are biased).
119 One exception appears to concern enforcement of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, where the implementing statute provides that AJs shall conduct
hearings under 5 U.S.C. § 554, the formal-adjudication triggering provision under the
APA. 22 U.S.C. § 8142(a)(2)–(a)(3) (2012).
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functions and ex parte communications do not apply.120 That said,
agencies may have prohibitions concerning ex parte communications
via rule, decision, or tradition.121 Agencies, too, may have some
express separation of functions simply by limiting AJs from engaging
in, say, prosecutorial decisions.122 Or they may have de facto
separation by creating a class of AJs whose only duties are to preside
over hearings123 or by physically separating certain attorneys from
other agency employees and titling them “administrative judges.”124
These more informal methods of providing independence, where they
exist, may be successful in leading AJs themselves to feel as free as
ALJs from agency pressure.125 But such informal agency protections do
not exist throughout the administrative state, can be difficult to police,
and are not beyond an agency’s abolition.
II.

BLACK-TIE OPTIONAL: CHOOSING ALJS OR AJS

Agencies have significant discretion to determine when to use
hearings with all of the APA’s formal-adjudication trappings and thus
ALJs. The APA requires “formal adjudication” — which provides
certain rights for parties and limitations on the agency — whenever
the adjudication is “required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing.”126 Agencies, except in rare
circumstances, must use ALJs for formal adjudication.127 Agencies may
use AJs for informal adjudication. In the absence of express “on the
record” language, courts generally find Congress’s directive
ambiguous and defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
whether the hearing must be “on the record” under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.’s well-known two-step deference regime.128 For
120

See Frye, supra note 3, at 344.
See id.
122 See id. at 284 (discussing regulations that limit Coast Guard AJs from serving as
prosecutors, but not prohibiting ex parte communications).
123 See id. at 270-71.
124 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 787 (discussing the
Department of the Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals).
125 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1054 (noting that “our empirical survey shows
that AJs consider themselves just as independent as ALJs”).
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); see also id. § 554(a) (2012) (differing, albeit
immaterially, from § 553 by stating that the adjudication must be “required by statute
to be determined on the record” (emphasis added)).
127 See id. §§ 554(a), 556 (2012).
128 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). At
the first step, the Court asks whether the statute clearly expresses Congress’s intent. If
so, the court enforces that intent. See id. at 842-43. But if Congress has left a gap or
121
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instance, the First Circuit held that the term “public hearing” was
ambiguous and upheld the reasonableness of the agency’s
interpretation via informal rulemaking that formal adjudication was
not required for certain permitting.129 Aside from the Ninth Circuit, all
circuits give agencies a wide berth to decide whether adjudication
must be formal.130
Contrary to popular impression,131 agencies do not always use their
discretion to choose informal proceedings with AJs. For example, the
FTC uses formal adjudication, despite the absence of on-the-record
language in the FTC Act. The FTC Act permits the FTC to adjudicate
via an administrative “proceeding” when it has “reason to believe
that . . . any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or
practice” has occurred.132 In what appears to have gone unnoticed, the
FTC Act never requires that the proceedings be “on the record,”
although it mandates that testimony “be reduced to writing” and
otherwise describes the administrative “hearing” for issuing a ceaseand-desist order.133 The reduction-to-writing requirement for
testimony seems, at best, ambiguous. It requires a transcription of
testimony, but it does not otherwise require that the entirety of the
hearing — motions or other nontestimonial evidence — be included
in a record, nor does it require an oral hearing for the taking of

ambiguity in the statute for the agency to fill, the Court merely asks at step two whether
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id. at 843.
129 See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st
Cir. 2006).
130 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2, at 710-11 (5th
ed. 2010) (noting that a D.C. Circuit decision after Chevron that gave agencies the
ability to decide whether formal adjudication is required “has been followed by a
veritable flood of similar opinions from many circuits in many contexts”); JOHN M.
ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Dominion Energy decision
leaves the . . . Ninth Circuit as the only remaining U.S. Court of Appeals that adheres
to the Seacoast presumption that a hearing requirement, in the context of an
adjudicatory proceeding, triggers [the APA’s formal protections].”).
131 See Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 892 (“Agencies never choose to
have adjudication under the APA.”).
132 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012).
133 Id.
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evidence.134 Despite the lack of formal adjudication’s triggering
language, the FTC has chosen formal adjudication with ALJs.135
Similarly, the SSA has chosen to use ALJs in the absence of any “on
the record” language.136 A 1977 amendment to the Act concerning the
appointment of temporary ALJs converted those temporary ALJs into
“career-absolute positions as [ALJs].”137 This amendment and
significant legislative history around the time of the amendment
suggest that Congress intended the SSA to use ALJs.138 But after
Chevron and the judiciary’s broad deference to agencies on the
formality question, it is far from clear that the SSA is required to use
ALJs or formal adjudication under the APA. After all, legislative
history to statutory amendments in 1994 states that although the SSA
uses ALJs, the use of ALJs and formal APA proceedings are “not
required by law.”139 The SSA’s use of ALJs is all the more striking
because the ALJs “departed from their traditional association with the
trial-type process that had been contemplated by APA formal
adjudication procedures” by presiding over nonadversarial,
134 Cf. Michael A. Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The Need
for Impartial Decisonmakers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 1, 24 n.110 (1994) (noting that similar language in the 1930 Tariff Act was
amended by the Trade Act of 1974 — after United States v. Florida East Coast Railway,
410 U.S. 224 (1973) — to require “on the record” proceedings).
135 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency
Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 837 (2010) (“The [FTC] implements these
provisions through rulemaking and formal adjudication.”). The FTC is not required to
use ALJs, even if the implementing Congress was likely to have formal proceedings in
mind. In Florida East Coast Railway, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s
reasoning that the 1917 Congress that enacted the Esch Act (the statute at issue in
that case) would have likely considered a “hearing” a more formal affair based on the
Court’s roughly contemporaneous precedent. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry.
Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236-37 (1973). The Court held that such an interpretation was
inconsistent with the APA’s on-the-record requirement, and it noted that Congress did
not add an on-the-record requirement to the statute when it amended it after the
APA’s enactment. See id. at 235-37. Likewise, the FTC Act was also enacted during the
1910s, and it has been amended after the APA’s passage without adding an on-therecord requirement.
136 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349.
137 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat.
1509, 1559 (1977).
138 See Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The
APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203, 235-42 (2002) (discussing the legislative
history of the SSA and how the 1977 amendments clarified uncertainty as to whether
ALJs were required).
139 See 140 Cong. Rec. H6843 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994), cited in Arzt, Adjudications,
supra note 64, at 305 (arguing that the statement in the legislative history was
“erroneous” and “unresearched gratuitous dictum”).
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nonlawyer-based hearings in which the ALJs were representing the
government, the claimant, and serving as impartial decider.140
The FTC and SSA’s choice to use ALJs under their enabling acts is
consistent with their separate, but extensive (though not unlimited),
statutory authority to appoint ALJs. Congress has provided that
“[e]ach agency shall appoint as many [ALJs] as are necessary for
proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556
and 557 of [title 5].”141 This provision gives the agencies broad
discretion to determine how many ALJs to appoint, but it also limits
those appointments to proceedings “required to be” formal. That
limitation suggests that an agency’s power to appoint ALJs extends
only to instances in which the statute or agency requires formal
adjudication, whether Congress unambiguously requires it or the
agency has found it reasonable under the statute (via Chevron) to do
so in light of congressional ambiguity or silence on procedure.142 It
would not extend to instances in which Congress has clearly indicated
that formal proceedings should not apply, such as with immigration
proceedings.143
This often-overlooked agency discretion, even if limited to when
formality is permitted under an ambiguous statute, is important.
Others, including the Administrative Conference of the United States
(“ACUS”), have called for Congress to require agencies, based on
fairness and administrative uniformity, to use ALJs in more

140

Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349.
5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
142 As another example, an agency may reasonably decide that adjudications should
be formal, despite the lack of on-the-record language, when Congress uses a
substantial-evidence standard of review over certain “hearings,” see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1234a(c)–(d)(1) (2012), and requires the agency to appoint ALJs to preside over
those determinations, see id. § 1234(b) (requiring the Secretary of Education to
appoint ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and preside over certain hearings, including those
under § 1234a, which does not specifically require on-the-record hearings).
143 The predecessor agency to the OPM initially refused to create a register of SSA
ALJs because it did not think that SSA hearings had to be formal. See Wolfe, supra
note 138, at 213 (citing STAFF OF COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 93D CONG., REPORT ON THE
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 55 (1974), microfilmed on CIS No. H782-29 (Cong.
Info. Serv.)). The Administrative Conference of the United States, citing its informal
communications with lawyers at OPM, indicated in a report that the OPM takes the
position that either the statute or regulation must require formal adjudication before it
will create a register of ALJ candidates for an agency. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND
PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 13, 27-29
(2014) [hereinafter ACUS EEOC RPT.], available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf.
141
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proceedings.144 Congress, much to my chagrin, has shown little
interest in doing so, even as it chastises agencies when abuses come to
light.145 Instead, one may be more successful in having agencies
themselves decide — with their broad statutory discretion — to use
ALJs for formal hearings. This Article seeks to identify first why
agencies are generally thought to prefer AJs and why their preference
may not be as beneficial as presupposed.
III. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF AJS’ BENEFITS
Agencies nearly always choose AJs over ALJs. As Paul Verkuil
concisely explained, “[T]hey are opting for a decider who has less
decisional independence, lower pay and benefits, and less job
security.”146 Notably, these characteristics (as well as agencies’
freedom to appoint AJs147) all point to the same benefit for agencies —
control.148 From agencies’ viewpoint, control permits them to
influence agency policy and render proceedings, guided by employees

144 ACUS had recommended that Congress require formal adjudication for cases
concerning “substantial impact on personal liberties or freedom,” “criminal-like
culpability,” “sanctions with substantial economic effect,” or findings of
discrimination. 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 12; see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra
note 3, at 1058 (“Congress should consider expanding the category of cases where
ALJs are required . . . .”); McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 226 (“One
way around biased administrative judges would be to adopt the recommendation of
the ACUS Report in letter as well as spirit, and mandate the use of independent federal
administrative law judges, rather than administrative judges or hearing examiners, in
any case where there is a substantial risk of deprivation of life, liberty, or property
(including job tenure), and also for non-tenured whistleblower removals.”).
145 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1008-09 (“It is unlikely, however, that Congress
will be persuaded to [require agencies to use ALJs] in the foreseeable future. The
reason is that agencies strongly resist being required to utilize ALJs, whether in newly
adopted or existing hearing schemes.”); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1351
(writing contemporaneously with the 1992 ACUS Report, calling for congressional
action). Congress did respond with hearings when the IJs were hired on partisan
grounds. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
146 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347.
147 See id.; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity
Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 72 (1996) [hereinafter APA-Adjudication]
(arguing that AJs have become more populous than ALJs “because of a perception
that, compared to non-ALJ adjudicators, ALJs are less desirable because of their cost,
restrictions on their selection, and their effective immunity from performance
management”).
148 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1020 (“Agencies understandably wish to avoid
the numerous statutory provisions relating to the hiring, compensation, rotation,
evaluation, and tenure of ALJs.”).
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with technical expertise and more interaction with others in the
agency, more efficient.
This subsection presents the case for AJs from agencies’ vantage
point. Part IV responds to AJs’ putative benefits by first identifying the
overlooked costs of controlling AJs (and concomitantly the benefits of
choosing independent ALJs) and then contending that AJs’ remaining
benefits are overstated.
A. Control, Expertise, and Efficiency
Control allows agencies to appoint AJs with technical expertise. One
of the key criticisms of the ALJ-selection process is that agencies have
little ability to hire ALJs with subject-matter expertise and that the
ALJs on the OPM’s hiring list frequently have no background in the
regulatory program for which they will adjudicate.149 But with AJ
hiring, agencies generally have full authority over deciding who is
hired,150 and those AJs often come from the agency’s own employee
ranks.151 Not only is the agency likely to have more information on a
hired AJ’s suitability for adjudication, but — perhaps most importantly
— the agency is also better able to ensure that the AJ has expertise in
the applicable regulatory program.152 To obtain AJs with expertise,
certain agencies have reported that, at least for those AJs without other
responsibilities, they provide some form of competitive appointment
that considers case-management ability, technical expertise, and legal
knowledge.153
149 See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 5-7 (discussing agencies’ limited
selection options); Asimow, supra note 25, 1009 (“The [ALJ-selection] process allows
little room for judgment and discretion, and affords agencies virtually no choice in
which ALJs to hire. It does not take account of whether a new ALJ has specialized
experience in the regulatory or beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”). But
see Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL
ST. J., July 15, 2015 [hereinafter In-House Court] (quoting Erin Wirth, president of the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference, as arguing that ALJs are generalists
who do not need expertise in their fields).
150 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“The selection and appointment
procedures for administrative judges are controlled by the agencies themselves.”).
151 Of the 2,692 AJs reported in the 1992 Frye Survey, more than 2,000 (including
those who do not work for agencies) perform other tasks for the agency. See Frye,
supra note 3, app. B.
152 See Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency
Adjudications, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1527, 1545 (2012) (noting that if the FCC
turned to AJs, instead of ALJs, to improve adjudications, “[t]he FCC would be free,
however, to hire AJs with subject matter experience, something that ALJs may not
have”).
153 See Frye, supra note 3, at 272; see also id. at 285 (discussing how Coast Guard
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Relatedly, agency control over proceedings encourages more
efficient decision-making by influencing the ongoing proceeding. First
and perhaps more importantly for agencies, AJs’ informal hearings
permit agencies to influence decisions. Because AJs almost always
preside over hearings that are not “on the record,” the agency is
neither prohibited by the APA from engaging in ex parte
communications with the AJ to clarify issues related to a factual
dispute nor prohibited from having its prosecutorial or investigative
staff advise the AJ on legal issues,154 unless the Due Process Clause
limits these interactions in particular scenarios. In other words, from
the agency’s perspective, the integration of the AJ into the agency
permits the agency to further its policy goals more efficiently by
forgoing the usual trappings of independence found in judicial or ALJ
hearings and rendering less necessary appellate proceedings in which
the agency overturns the initial decision. Second, AJs are subject to
performance appraisals that may affect their salaries155 and may permit
agencies to reward an AJ based on productivity and perhaps
cooperation with furthering policy objectives. Finally, agencies can
also remove inefficient or inexpert AJs more easily than ALJs. Unlike
with ALJs, agencies do not have to obtain the MSPB’s prior consent
before terminating an AJ’s employment.156
Aside from separation of functions and ex parte prohibitions, AJ
proceedings allow procedural innovation and simplicity.157 Agencies
argue that informality furthers flexibility and efficiency goals.158
Indeed, Paul Verkuil’s noteworthy study nearly forty years ago
revealed that agency adjudication varies tremendously in the
procedures that are followed, even within one agency.159 For instance,
he noted that the Department of Agriculture has some of the most and
focuses on a hearing officer’s technical knowledge and less on the ability to preside
over hearings because few hearings occur).
154 At least one agency, the MSPB, has sought to create some protection from
appraisals that overtly or covertly depend on the AJs’ decisions and compliance with
agency goals by having ALJs conduct the appraisals. See McCarthy, Blowing in the
Wind, supra note 52, at 216. But this mitigating measure is not universal.
155 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
156 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
157 There are limited exceptions in which non-ALJs can preside over formal
adjudication. See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 199-200 (Jeffrey B.
Litwak ed., 2012).
158 See Frye, supra note 3, at 268 (discussing agencies’ view that informality
improves agency control and efficiency of achieving policy goals that Congress has set
for the agency).
159 See generally Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35.
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least formal proceedings — as measured by ten characteristics
mentioned by the Supreme Court in a leading due process decision,
Goldberg v. Kelly160 — out of four agencies and 42 programs that he
studied.161 Other agencies’ use of AJs and informal proceedings, as
compared to formal adjudication under the APA, permit agencies to
reduce the costs of adjudication and tailor the adjudication to the
importance of the dispute at hand.162
B. Purported Lower Costs
What is more, AJs are purportedly cheaper.163 ALJs’ salaries are set
by statute and OPM regulations.164 Their current, somewhat complex
salary system accounts for administrative responsibilities, length of
federal service, and various exceptional circumstances.165 New ALJs’
salary, before any locality or other adjustments,166 is approximately,
for ease of reference, $106,000.167 ALJs without significant managerial

160

See id. at 760 & n.80.
See id. at 775.
162 See Asimow, supra note 25, 1009 (“[Formal adjudication with ALJs] interferes
with an agency’s ability to manage its adjudicatory function and increases an agency’s
costs of conducting adjudication.”).
163 See, e.g., id. (“ALJs are also more highly compensated than most [AJs].”); Robert
J. McCarthy, Why MSPB Judges Reject 98 Percent of Whistleblower Appeals, FED. LAW.,
Mar. 2013, at 37 [hereinafter MSPB Judges] (“Presumably, the board opted to replace
ALJs with ‘attorney-examiners’ at least partly to save money, since the more highly
qualified ALJs make higher salaries than do the board’s attorneys.”).
164 See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012); Pay & Leave, Pay Administration, Fact Sheet:
Administrative Law Judge Pay System, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-law-judge-paysystem (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter ALJ Pay Fact Sheet].
165 See ALJ Pay Fact Sheet, supra note 164 (“The ALJ pay system has three levels of
basic pay: AL-1, AL-2, and AL-3. Pay level AL-3 is the basic pay level for ALJ positions
filled through competitive examination. Pay level AL-3 has six rates of basic pay: A, B,
C, D, E, and F. . . . ALJ positions are placed at levels AL-2 and AL-1 when they involve
significant administrative and managerial responsibilities. . . . [ALJs] must serve at
least one year in each AL pay level, or in an equivalent or higher level in positions in
the Federal service, before advancing to the next higher level.”).
166 See Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, 2015 Locality Rates of Pay, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
15Tables/exec/html/ALJ_LOC.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). The locality
adjustments can lead to salary increases of more than $30,000 but reach a ceiling of
$168,700, at all pay levels. See id.
167 See Pay & Leave: Salaries & Wages, Salary Table No. 2015-ALJ, OPM.gov,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
15Tables/exec/html/ALJ.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 2015-ALJ Table].
161
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responsibilities can earn up to approximately $147,000 based on 2015
salary tables.168
In comparison, most AJs’ starting salaries can be significantly lower
than ALJs’, although the data often fail to provide sufficient specific
information. The 1992 Frye Survey reported that approximately 91%
of government-employed AJs were paid according to the general
service salary table from Grades 9 to 15 (i.e., GS-9 through GS-15).169
The 2015 starting basic pay rates for these employees vary from
approximately $42,000 to $102,000 before locality, seniority, or other
adjustments — all lower than ALJs’ basic starting salaries.170 Likewise,
the Limon Updated Survey reported that, aside from unique pay
schedules for certain AJs, pay grades ranged from GS-7 to SES.171
Nevertheless, as I explain in Part IV.B.1, these savings are not as
significant as they first appear.
IV. RULING AGAINST AJS
This Part critically examines the putative benefits of choosing AJs
and concludes that, on balance, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs
to further their own interests. First, it considers the often-overlooked
benefits of using ALJs that agencies relinquish when prioritizing
control of AJs over other values. It then considers how AJs’ remaining
benefits are exaggerated, especially in light of the benefits that ALJs
provide agencies. Finally, it considers how the administrative state can
work to give agencies the key benefit of technical expertise from AJs
that the ALJ-selection process cannot currently guarantee. Ultimately,
as I discuss, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs in nearly all
circumstances and seek congressional permission to do so when
necessary.

168 See id. ALJs are eligible for the highest pay after seven years of service. See ALJ
Pay Fact Sheet, supra note 164 (“Required Waiting Periods”).
169 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B (“2,228 [AJs] are in grades 9 through 15”). Frye
uncovered a total of 2,692 AJs. See id. Of that group, 237 were not government
employees, leaving 2,455 government-employed AJs. See id. He reports that 2,228 AJs
were in pay grades GS-9 through GS-15, see id., which is approximately 91% of the
2,455 government-employed AJs.
170 See Pay & Leave Salaries & Wages, Salary Table 2015-GS, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
15Tables/html/GS.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 2015-GS Table].
171 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 3. Limon’s more limited data does not reveal the
number of AJs who work in the General Service. See id. app. C at 1-6 (not
differentiating which AJs within an agency receive different pay grades).
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A. Benefits of Ceding Some Agency Control
The most important benefit that agencies receive from using ALJs is
improved appearances of impartiality. This appearance is important in
two ways: (1) to preclude a successful due-process challenge to AJs
based on two of the Supreme Court’s most recent due process and
separation-of-powers decisions (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.172
and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,173 respectively), and (2) to limit a
public-relations embarrassment, which would very likely exceed the
SEC fiasco and potentially influence numerous audiences that agencies
care about. Agencies’ use of ALJs in formal adjudication under the
APA also provides other, more limited benefits, including a greater
likelihood of receiving deference on judicial review and absolute
official immunity for agency adjudicators. To be sure, these more
limited benefits may be of marginal significance for some agencies, but
they should still be included in agencies’ formality calculus.
1.

Improving the Appearance of Impartiality

The key problem with AJs is that agency control over them creates
an appearance of partiality. This appearance presents two problems —
a constitutional one and a practical one.
a.

Avoiding a Substantial Due Process Question

For good reason, the mere appearance of impartiality is as salient as
actual bias.174 By prohibiting the appearance of partiality, one
primarily seeks to protect the integrity of the adjudicating body and
validate the process.175 Notably, these attributes inure primarily to the
benefit of the agency itself, as opposed to the litigants, because a valid
process helps to validate final agency action with litigants, reviewing
courts, Congress, and the public.176 Moreover, policing for
172

556 U.S. 868 (2009).
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
174 See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias,
2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 967 (discussing how recusal standards in American
jurisdictions center around appearances of impartiality).
175 See id. at 968.
176 Cf. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 522 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If the President
seeks to regulate through impartial adjudication, then insulation of the adjudicator
from removal at will can help him achieve that goal. And to free a technical
decisionmaker from the fear of removal without cause can similarly help create
legitimacy with respect to that official’s regulatory actions by helping to insulate his
technical decisions from nontechnical political pressure.”).
173
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appearances of partiality serves as a prophylaxis for ferreting out
unconscious bias or bias that professional norms render difficult to
admit.177 For this reason, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
adjudicators’ declarations that they lack actual bias are not
determinative (or even relevant).178 Because of the difficulty in
determining an adjudicator’s subjective state of mind, due process
mostly concerns itself with appearances of partiality.179
The Supreme Court appeared, in the past, to limit its appearance-ofpartiality inquiries only to instances in which the adjudicator had a
pecuniary interest in the outcome. For instance, the Court in Tumey v.
Ohio required a mayor to recuse from deciding certain prohibitionrelated fines because, for every guilty verdict, a portion of the fine
supplemented the mayor’s salary and a portion went into the town’s
general treasury.180 The Court, in Ward v. Monroeville, expanded
mandated recusal to scenarios where fines from a mayor’s court went
only into the town’s general treasury.181
In the context of AJs, the inquiry seemed even more limited. The
Court’s key decision is Schweiker v. McClure, in which it upheld the
use of insurance-carrier AJs from, among other things, a partiality
challenge.182 After noting the AJs’ functional equivalence to ALJs’
quasi-judicial capacity, the Court noted that due process applied.183
The moving parties had not overcome the presumption of an
adjudicator’s impartiality because “generalized assumptions of possible
interest” were insufficient.184 The AJs’ connection to insurers was not
meaningful because the federal government, not the carriers, paid the
claims and the AJs’ salaries.185 In footnotes, the Court mentioned that
the challenging parties had not brought any evidence “to support their
assertion that, for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or
carrier coercion, [AJs] would be reluctant to differ with carrier
determinations.”186 It also noted that the AJs’ former or current
177

See Bam, supra note 174, at 967.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882, 886-87 (2009)
(before finding a due process violation based on the appearance of partiality, noting
that the judge at issue declared that he had no actual bias and stating that the Court
would not determine whether actual bias existed).
179 See Bam, supra note 174, at 967.
180 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927).
181 See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972).
182 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97, 200 (1982).
183 Id. at 195.
184 See id. at 196.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 196 n.10.
178
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employment relationship with the carrier did not create the same
partiality concerns as “professional relationship[s] between a judge
and a former partner or associate.”187 McClure was but one decision
from the 1950s until 1990 in which the Court batted away due process
challenges to agency procedures and structures.188
The Court’s reasoning in its latest impartiality decision — focusing
on appointment and removal, unlike prior decisions — strongly
disrupts the longstanding narrative that, after McClure, AJs do not
offend due process.189 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a corporate
defendant was appealing an unfavorable verdict when its president
contributed $3 million to have Justice Benjamin elected to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.190 Only $1,000 went directly to
the campaign committee; the remaining amount went to a political
organization and other independent organizations that supported
Justice Benjamin.191 After defeating the incumbent by fewer than
50,000 votes,192 Justice Benjamin refused to recuse from Caperton
because he denied having actual bias.193
The Supreme Court held that due process required his recusal.194 No
quid pro quo or actual bias was necessary.195 Instead, the Court was
“concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt
adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”196 The Court merely looked for
an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”197 Such “fears of bias can
187

See id. at 197 n.11.
See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349-51, for an excellent discussion of
how the court has approved of SSA ALJs’ “three hat” role as judge and counsel for
both parties, agency adjudicators’ combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions,
the minimal procedural requirements of APA § 555 for informal proceedings, privately
employed AJs, and limited appeal options.
189 See, e.g., Kapnik, supra note 152, at 1544-45 (citing VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3,
at 978-79) (“AJs meet the constitutional requirement for due process . . . .”); Krent,
supra note 74, at 1091 & n.38 (citing Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s and
1970s for the proposition that “[i]ndividuals enjoyed no Due Process rights to an
independent judicial officer insulated from presidential supervision”); Verkuil,
Reflections, supra note 3, at 1350 (“For due process purposes the Court seems willing
to narrow the bias or conflict of interest inquiry into one involving only pecuniary
interests.”).
190 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 873-76.
194 Id. at 886.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 878, 881.
197 See id. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971)).
188
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arise when — without the other parties’ consent — a man chooses the
judge in his own cause.”198 Applying this standard, the Court noted
that the defendant’s president knew that the appeal from the
unfavorable verdict was pending, fewer than 50,000 votes decided the
election, and the president’s disproportionate contributions had a
substantial impact on the election, even if voters ultimately selected
Justice Benjamin.199 The Court found, accordingly, “a serious,
objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal”
because it appeared that the defendant “[chose] the judge in [its] own
case.”200 Ultimately, these circumstances presented (as the Court’s
opinion repeated four times) “a possible temptation to the average . . .
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”201
To be sure, the Court’s decision concerned extreme circumstances in
the judicial-election context. But impartiality under the Due Process
Clause is required for administrative adjudication,202 and Caperton’s
due-process reasoning is even more compelling and requires no
extension when applied to AJs.
First and most importantly, the Court considers whether one of the
parties had a “significant and disproportionate influence” on the
appointment process.203 For AJs’, the agency’s role in the appointment
process is much more prominent than the corporate president’s.
There, the corporate president only indirectly impacted the election
with disproportionate contributions; voters directly chose Justice
Benjamin. But the agency directly chooses its AJs.204 The agency, even
more so than the defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to
proceedings before the AJ whom it hired, such as in governmentcontract disputes, immigration proceedings, and numerous other
appellate and enforcement proceedings. The agency directly and
literally “chooses the judge in [its] own case,” without, as in the case
of federal judges, any check from another branch or, as in the case of
ALJs, any approval from another agency.205 This appointment
198

Id. at 886.
See id. at 884-86.
200 Id. at 886.
201 See id. at 878-79, 885-86.
202 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). I accept this premise for
my purposes here, but I plan in future work to consider the role of impartiality
generally in due process.
203 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
204 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
205 Some concerns may exist for ALJs, too. When agencies other than the SSA hire
ALJs, they often hire current SSA ALJs to avoid the OPM hiring process. See A GUIDE
TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION, supra note 157, at 203. This ability to hire SSA
199
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reinforces the “common perception [that] administrative adjudicators
are likely to be too committed to the agency’s positions” and “imbued
with the agency’s culture.”206 For a key example, one needs only turn
to the George W. Bush Administration’s hiring of immigration judges,
when “[a]ll the judges appointed during this period who arrived with
experience in immigration law were prosecutors or held other
immigration enforcement jobs.”207
Second, in what appears contrary to McClure, the Court relied only
on the circumstances of Justice Benjamin’s election to find an
appearance of partiality.208 This suggests that evidence concerning
adjudicators’ appointment and removal can adequately demonstrate
the “psychological tendencies and human weaknesses” that create
bias. Importantly, the appointment and removal of privately employed
AJs in McClure is distinguishable from government-employed AJs,
with the latter creating easily understood bias concerns. Governmentemployed AJs receive their salaries from the agencies that may appear
before them and that seek to pursue certain policy and enforcement
objectives, unlike the insurer in McClure that did not pay the AJs, have
any of its money at issue, or have any policy goals to further through
the adjudications.
Third, the Court discounted a judge’s denials of bias. In one survey
from the early 1990s, AJs reported having less anxiety over their
impartiality than more independent ALJs,209 leading one prominent
scholar to conclude that the relationship between structural
protections and impartiality for AJs is overstated.210 Yet that report is
of little weight because due process concerns itself with not only
conscious but also, much more frequently, unconscious bias and
circumstances that could create it.
In addition to these express considerations concerning appointment,
the Court also likely implicitly contemplated the appointing party’s
related power to help later remove the judge. After all, the President
appoints federal judges, and he or she may soon thereafter appear
ALJs permits the hiring agency more control over hiring ALJs than the OPM process,
but these ALJs had to comply originally with the OPM-approved process to be hired
by the SSA.
206 Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 702-03.
207 See Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 23.
208 The Court did mention a public-opinion poll and certain other West Virginia
Justices’ views that recusal was required in the background in its opinion, but it did
not mention these “facts” in its analysis. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874-75, 886-87.
209 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L.
REV. 271, 279 (1994).
210 See id.
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frequently as a party before them. But the mere appointment does not
create an appearance of partiality because the President — having no
role in the impeachment process211 — has no meaningful way to
discipline or remove the judge for ruling against him or her. The
difference in Caperton is that the donor had the wherewithal to fund
Justice Benjamin’s opponent in the next election if Justice Benjamin
did not reward his benefactor. For AJs, the appointing agency has a
much more direct way in which to remove the AJ. That agency can
directly remove the AJ without, as with ALJs or federal judges, another
agency’s or branch’s signoff. The President or a supervising officer
could, despite potential political backlash, have the AJ find facts or
apply law in certain ways or discipline or remove those who are not
“cooperative.” AJs, similar to the mayor in Tumey, can have their pay
affected depending on what decision they make; they are literally on
one of the parties’ payroll. Performance reviews and ex parte
communications, the vehicles for effecting discipline and pushing
agency positions, are not public, thereby concealing agency influence.
With this direct agency control over appointment and removal, it is
difficult to see how Caperton’s “unconstitutional potential for bias”
would not exist with AJs.
A second recent decision — specifically focusing on the link
between removal and control212 — buttresses this conclusion. In Free
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Court precluded Congress from
cocooning the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) within two layers of protection from the President’s at-will
removal.213 The SEC Commissioners, whom the President could not
remove at will (the first layer), could appoint PCAOB members and
remove them only for cause (the second layer).214 Together, these
layers unconstitutionally impinged the President’s supervisory power
by preventing him from holding the SEC responsible for PCAOB’s
actions in the same manner as he could hold the SEC accountable for
its other responsibilities.215 Importantly for our purposes here, the
Court reaffirmed that the power to remove officials is key for
211 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 831 & n.220 (arguing
that proposals to provide ALJs the same protections as Article III judges would likely
violate the President’s supervisory powers over executive officials because the
President has no role in impeachment).
212 See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013)
(questioning Free Enterprise Fund’s conclusion that removal gives control).
213 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 483-84 (2010).
214 See id. at 486-87.
215 See id. at 495-96.

2016]

Against Administrative Judges

1677

establishing control because “one who holds his office only during the
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude
of independence against the latter’s will.”216 AJs, of course, work at the
pleasure of the agency, which also generally assesses performance
reviews that can affect their pay.217 Free Enterprise Fund establishes the
following: (1) the agency’s power to remove (or transfer) and affect
AJs’ pay gives agencies control, and (2) that control impacts
impartiality. Indeed, the majority went out of its way to indicate that
ALJs, with their two layers of protection, were a special case because
of their adjudicative function218 and, presumptively, need to be free
from policymakers’ interference.
These relationships among removal, control, and impartiality were
not lost on the APA drafters and early implementers. The perceived
bias of adjudicators was the impetus for establishing the APA’s formal
adjudication with protections concerning ALJs’ appointment,
performance review, and removal.219 Hearings were intended to be
heard by independent ALJs to ensure that “whoever presides . . . must
conduct the hearing in a strictly impartial manner, rather than as the
representative of an investigative or prosecuting authority.”220 Indeed,
speaking against performance reviews for adjudicators shortly after the
APA’s enactment and striking down agencies’ ability to promote ALJs
to higher pay grades, U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath stated
that “[i]f salaries and promotions are subject to agency control, there
is always danger that a subtle influence will be exerted upon the
examiners to decide in accordance with agency wishes.”221 Notably,
the Attorney General made these comments when all oral hearings
required by statute were presumed to be subject to the APA’s formality
requirements.222 The fact that courts have altered the presumption and
allowed AJs to “sprout[] faster than tulips in Holland”223 does not
216

See id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
218 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
219 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1353 & n.51 (citing Justice Scalia for
the proposition that hearing examiners before the APA were perceived as biased); see
also Scalia, supra note 43, at 65-66 (describing the history of the ALJ-promotion
system).
220 S. REP. NO. 752 at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 268 (1946).
221 See Wolfe, supra note 138, at 223 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act,
Promotion of Hearing Examiners, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 78 (1951)).
222 See Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 884 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v.
Clark, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950)).
223 See Lubbers, APA-Adjudication, supra note 147, at 70.
217
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undermine the link between control and agency influence. Moreover,
the link has not been lost on legal commenters,224 including a former
AJ and ALJ.225 Together, Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund establish a
compelling basis for holding that agencies’ use of AJs violates due
process.226
Let me conclude by addressing five possible objections:
First. Aside from IJ hiring and firing, might the absence of any
public outcry over AJs provide some ground for concluding that no
objective appearance of partiality exists?227 The emphatic answer,
especially for AJs, is no. One of AJs’ key attributes is that they are a
“hidden judiciary,” toiling away largely unnoticed. If they are noticed,
they are likely to be confused with ALJs because of their similar titles.
It would be perverse to create a principle under which the government
could preclude appearances of partiality by creating an opaque
adjudicatory system and similar titles for judges with and without
independence. Administrative adjudication does not become fairer by
becoming harder to understand.

224 See Dobkin, supra note 23, at 381 (“Because agencies sometimes base hiring —
and firing — practices on the outcomes they expect to receive from administrative
judges, these judges are under enormous pressure to keep their employers happy.”);
McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 210 (“Most observers agree that a
lack of independence from the agencies they serve is the main reason for the
seemingly uniform bias of administrative judges in favor of those agencies.”); Wolfe,
supra note 138, at 245 (“Adjudication by non-APA hearing officers, who are subject to
the control, direction, performance rating, promotion, and discipline of their
employing agency poses the risk of the potential curtailment of a [claimant’s] due
process rights.”).
225 See Frye, supra note 3, at 261, 268 (“It is self-evident that, to the extent that the
agencies use informal means to control the process and its substantive results, they
detract from the impartiality of the presiding officer, the fairness of the proceeding,
and the satisfaction of the public with the results.”).
226 The agency’s ability to overrule AJs on fact and law does not mean that their
decisions are meaningless. Their credibility findings (like ALJs’) can be very
significant, affecting whether the record supports an agency’s contrary decision on
administrative appeal. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951)
(considering findings by an ALJ); see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1036 (noting
that ALJ findings are particularly influential on courts when based on inferences from
testimonial demeanor). Indeed, appellate courts review with a more careful eye agency
findings that are contrary to initial findings. See Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565
F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1977) (referring to NLRB v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d
342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499
(2d Cir. 1967)).
227 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“Despite these differences, it
appears that litigants and the public do not object to the process by which
administrative judges are selected.”).
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Second. Isn’t it sufficient that many AJs are required by statute,
regulation, or manual to be impartial228 or that the agency has certain
de facto understandings that discourage interfering with AJ decisional
independence?229 No. These requirements or understandings may
mean well, but they do not answer the impartiality question. After all,
federal and state judges are required to be impartial under the Code of
Judicial Conduct,230 but — even if they believe subjectively that they
are impartial — they can, as Caperton itself demonstrates, still create
an appearance of partiality. More fundamentally, the statutory
requirement for impartiality is not a structural prophylaxis against bias
like regulating the appointment, performance-review, and removal
processes. The litigants are also not in a position to know the AJs’
performance reviews, express or implicit threats of removal or
reassignment, or the agency culture that may reduce impartiality. De
facto norms also do not address the ease of their breach or how AJs
may feel pressure to minimize the breadth of these understandings
when those who may have a say in their retention and pay have
contrary “understandings.”
Third. Doesn’t AJs’ due process problem prove too much because it
implicates all administrative adjudication? After all, will agency heads
— nominated by the President and often removable at will — not be
similarly pressured to abide by the President’s wishes when reviewing
and (very rarely) presiding over hearings? This argument has some
force, but the due process problem can be justifiably confined to AJs
based on differences in agency heads’ function, their method of
appointment, salience of removal, and necessity. First, agency heads
are much more likely to be deciding policy matters finally for the
agency, and that policy discretion will be limited by the hearing
record. Although AJs and ALJs can make policy in the first instance,
their policy decisions are subject to reversal by the agency heads and
deputies. The President probably is entitled to oversee the policies via
228 For example, the Supreme Court pointed to such a requirement in the manual
that the government drafted to advise insurance-carrier AJs. See Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.11 (1982).
229 See, e.g., Frye, supra note 3, at 344 (discussing de facto understandings of
separation of functions for AJs with no other duties and ex parte prohibitions).
230 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2011) (“A judge shall . . . perform
[the] duties of judicial office . . . impartially.”). Whether the Code of Judicial Conduct
or similar ethical code should apply to state and federal ALJs is a perennially contested
issue. See generally Steven A. Glazer, Toward a Model Code of Judicial Conduct for
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 337 (2012); Patricia E. Salkin,
Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7 (2002).
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at-will removal authority for matters that are related to core executive
power, such as foreign affairs and defense.231 Second, the President’s
nomination of agency heads may be less troubling than AJs because
the Senate must confirm the nomination,232 and the agency head may
balance the views of the President with those of the confirming Senate
that may differ.233 Similarly, agency heads’ at-will removal234 may be
less troubling than AJs because their removal has a much stronger
salience than low-level agency employees like AJs.235 Agency heads
likely have their own political capital and relationships on Capitol Hill
and in the press, which permit them to create political backlash for the
President for questionable removals. The third distinction may be the
most important: agency heads’ appointment and removal (and any
accompanying downsides) are required236 by the Appointment and the
Take Care Clauses. If executive agencies’ ability to adjudicate is
beyond peradventure despite these constraints, then agencies heads’
appointment and removal cannot alone create a constitutional defect.
The same kind of necessity or compulsion does not apply to AJs, who
can be appointed in other ways (such as ALJs are or, as I have
suggested elsewhere, should be237) and removed only for cause (as
ALJs are).
Fourth. Should agencies really be worried that the Court will apply
Caperton — an opinion that refers to its narrow holding in the
judicial-election context — to agencies? Although the Court could, of
231 See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1349, 1404 n.215 (2013).
232 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring presidential nomination and
senatorial confirmation for “principal officers”).
233 See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 438, 439 (2004) (“[P]residents must anticipate the preferences of the Senate
in order to get their nominees confirmed, and a potential nominee’s policy preferences
are central to explaining the appointment outcome.”).
234 See Robert V. Percival, Who’s In Charge? Does the President Have Directive
Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2490 (2011)
(noting that President has “ability to remove non-independent agency heads at will”).
235 See Kent H. Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J., at *31
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2573216 (discussing the salience of removing senior executive officials); Percival, supra
note 234, passim (discussing the substantial costs of removal to effect policy ends).
236 Congress’s power to limit the President’s ability to remove executive officers at
will — especially in core departments, such as State and Defense — is beyond the
scope of this Article.
237 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 832-35 (advocating
that the D.C. Circuit appoint and remove ALJs to avoid appointment, removal, and
due process concerns).
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course, leave Caperton as an outlier of its due process jurisprudence,
two considerations counsel agency caution. First, my analysis here
requires no extension of Caperton’s reasoning; it requires only an
extension of the contextual setting. The reasoning in Caperton is even
more compelling in the agency context because the agency’s role in
hiring and firing is more direct than in the judicial-donor context. AJs
are even better candidates than state supreme courts for federal
judicial scrutiny because of AJs’ lack of comparative transparency,
salience, federalism complications, and factual variations surrounding
their systemic protections. Relatedly, heightened concern over AJs’
partiality makes sense because of courts’ limited oversight of AJ
decision-making. Not only do courts have little interest in what they
perceive as AJs’ low-prestige docket,238 but their review of AJ factual
findings — generally under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious-review
standard — is often deemed the most deferential in all of
administrative law.239 Second, the ramifications for the agency if it
loses are huge. Based on Caperton, the courts would likely require a
new proceeding for the litigant. But unlike Caperton where one justice
could simply recuse himself in the new proceeding, a due process
violation to AJs is systemic and would require regulatory or statutory
changes to AJ hiring, removal, and oversight. These changes would be
difficult to implement quickly, and they may require slow-moving
congressional action. Instead of reacting to a decision that requires
agencies to abandon AJs, agencies have the ability to recognize the due
process problem now, choose ALJs where possible, and seek
congressional permission when necessary.240

238 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional
Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2015) (noting that federal courts’ creation of an
appellate review model over agency action are an example of federal courts seeking to
“mitigate[] [the] caseload demands created by the new federal regulatory state” and to
remove “[p]etty” cases from their docket).
239 See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
arbitrary-and-capricious review is “more deferential” to agencies than the substantial
evidence standard); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)
(finding no difference between “arbitrary, capricious” and “substantial evidence”
standards for judicial review of agency findings of fact).
240 Agencies concerned about congressional lethargy may be able to create
sufficiently independent AJs through their own initiatives (if the underlying statutes
otherwise permit). They could, by rule, enact the same procedural protections for
parties as under the APA, limit the hiring of AJs to those who prevail in a merits-based
application process, limit the removal of AJs for only “good cause” as determined by
the MSPB, and prohibit performance reviews and bonuses.
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Fifth. Might the Court avoid applying Caperton to agencies because
of its general dislike for systemic, facial challenges? The Court, in the
racial-discrimination context, has indicated its distaste for inferring
bias in a particular case based on systemic bias,241 and it has indicated
its distaste for facial statutory challenges.242 In the administrative
context, the Court’s refusal to find a due process problem in Withrow
v. Larkin — based on a state agency’s ability to hold investigative and
merits hearings — may indicate the Court would be unwilling to find
a systemic due process problem when it implicates common features
of administrative process.243 Caperton, in fact, could be understood as
consistent with this understanding because it addressed one very
specific and extreme case concerning one judge without a broad,
disruptive holding.244 These are significant rebuttals, but they should
not preclude Caperton’s application here.
Courts routinely consider systemic protections or the lack thereof in
partiality challenges, and their holdings concerning one judge or
system would necessarily impact other tribunals. For instance, the
Court’s partiality decisions concerning mayors’ courts specifically
addressed only two small-town mayors. But the holding that saw
danger in remuneration to the mayor or his town would likewise affect
all mayors’ courts across the country, and it would be far from clear
that any other judge could preside, at least without legislative
intervention, to remedy the partiality problem. Likewise, albeit
rejecting the challenge, the Court considered the structural
impartiality challenge to the private hearing officers in McClure, and,
notably, that challenge did not focus on any particular adjudicator.
Moreover, a facial challenge in this context makes sense, at least for
similarly situated AJs. For AJs that share all key traits (no for-cause
protection from removal, appointment by their agencies, eligible for
performance-review bonuses, etc.), the matter requires little to no
discovery and the partiality problem would exist in all cases (not just
the litigated one). As a final matter, Withrow concerned heads of an
241 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to infer bias in a
capital defendant’s case based on studies indicating that black defendants in Georgia
received the death penalty more than white defendants). My thanks to Aziz Huq for
this insight.
242 See Caitlin Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through
Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 574-88 (2009).
243 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57-58 (1975).
244 Indeed, the majority and the dissent in Caperton argued over the breadth of the
Court’s decision and its potentially disruptive impacts. Compare Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887-90 (2009), with id. at 893-902 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
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agency, not adjudicators, and the propriety of combined functions of
investigation and adjudication in one agency, not the appearance of
partiality of administrative adjudicators. Although Withrow may show
some hesitation for the courts to limit agency powers, it does not
foreclose Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s application to AJs.
b.

Avoiding Practical Distractions

Even in the absence of the Due Process Clause, the SEC’s very
recent experiences with ALJs highlight why agencies have a significant
practical interest in providing adjudications with the appearance of
impartiality. First, agencies have to worry about winning lawsuits. The
SEC, instead of spending its time investigating and enforcing securities
laws, is currently distracted by trying to win lawsuits that seek to
upend the SEC’s (and sometimes the entire federal administrative
state’s) administrative-adjudicative apparatus. Those lawsuits allege,
among other things, constitutional infirmity with all SEC ALJs’
appointments and/or all ALJs’ removal (at any agency) under Article
II.245 Two federal district courts have preliminary enjoined the SEC’s
use of ALJs based on how they are appointed.246
But what do these appointment and removal challenges have to do
with impartiality? Nothing, as far as establishing the elements of those
causes of action. Nor do any of the parties assert a due process
challenge concerning impartiality. And that is what is fascinating. The
complaints use partiality, instead, to “color” — for courts, the press,

245 Complaint at 21-23, Timbervest v. SEC, (No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM), 2015 WL
7597428 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2015) [hereinafter Timbervest Complaint] (asserting
appointment and removal claims); Amended Complaint at 32-36, Hill v. SEC, (No.
1:15-cv-01801-LMM), 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2015) [hereinafter Hill
Amended Complaint] (asserting removal claims); Complaint at 16-21, Tilton v. SEC,
No. 1:15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Tilton Complaint]
(asserting appointment and removal claims); Complaint at 13-15, Stilwell v. SEC, No.
1:14-cv-07931 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Stilwell Complaint] (asserting
removal claim); Second Amended Complaint at 23-29, Gray Fin. Group, Inc. v. SEC,
No. 1:15-cv-00492-CAP (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2015); Amended Complaint at 11-14,
Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015) (asserting removal claim).
246 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316, 1320 (2015); Decision and
Order at 3-6, Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015) (holding that
the ALJs were “inferior officers” and appointed improperly under the Appointments
Clause, and giving the SEC seven days to decide whether to cure the defect). Another
of the cases was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Opinion and
Order at 1-2, Tilton v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015). Another
was voluntarily dismissed by agreement of the parties. See Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal, Stilwell v. SEC, No. 1:14-cv-07931 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015).
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and perhaps Congress — what might be understood as technical,
formal constitutional failings.
For instance, in Tilton v. SEC, the plaintiffs referred to one of the
SEC Commissioner’s concerns over how the SEC appears to bring
“tougher cases” in administrative adjudication where the parties have
limited discovery rights, instead of Article III courts.247 More
pointedly, the complaint (along with several others248) referred to a
2013 New York Times article that highlighted the SEC’s higher success
rate in administrative, as opposed to judicial, proceedings.249 Likewise,
the complaint in Hill v. SEC referred to the Wall Street Journal’s
empirical report that the SEC won in 95% of its proceedings between
January 2010 and March 2015, a prominent federal judge’s (U.S.
District Judge Jed Rakoff’s) remark that the SEC had won 100% of its
administrative actions in 2014 as compared to 61% in court, and a
former SEC ALJ’s public statements that the proceedings were not
impartial and that the Chief ALJ for the SEC had questioned her
“loyalty to the SEC” because of her decisions against the agency.250 As
a final example, the latest complaint (in Timbervest v. SEC), aside from
mentioning everything above, more directly addressed the partiality
concern. It noted how the presiding ALJ at issue “ha[d] yet to rule
against the agency” since his hiring in 2011,251 how the plaintiff
sought discovery on partiality issues in administrative proceedings,252
and how the presiding ALJ declined to submit an affidavit (in response
to the SEC’s request) affirming that he did not feel pressured to rule
for the agency.253
247 Hill Amended Complaint, supra note 245, at 21 (referring to Commissioner’s
statement concerning the perception surrounding how “tougher cases” are
adjudicated); Tilton Complaint, supra note 245, at 8-10 (citing Michael S. Piwowar,
Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly and
Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015)). A recent empirical study has concluded that “the SEC
[is] shifting more marginal cases from court to administrative proceedings or bringing
actions as administrative proceedings that would not have been brought at all preDodd Frank.” Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment 37 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 16-10, 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737105.
248 Stilwell Complaint, supra note 245, at 7.
249 Id. (citing Gretchen Morgenson).
250 Hill Amended Complaint, supra note 245, at 19-20. Other ALJs have made
similar complaints about other agencies, too. See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra
note 52, at 213 (collecting cases).
251 Timbervest Complaint, supra note 245, at 6.
252 Id. at 8.
253 Id. at 9-10.
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The parties’ ability to control the partiality narrative appears
successful. They have caught the notice of Judge Rakoff, national
media, regulated parties, powerful interest groups,254 and may have
even colored one district court’s Appointments Clause holding, which
it recognized as seeming “unduly technical.”255 And congressional
oversight, in light of corporate interest groups, may not be far off.
After all, Congress and the public were keenly interested in the
partisan hiring of IJs.256 In short, the failure to create the appearance of
impartiality has led to significant distraction and cost for the SEC in
attempting to fulfill its securities-enforcement mission. The SEC’s
curious public request that its own ALJ submit an affidavit concerning
his partiality further demonstrates that the SEC understands the
seriousness of the partiality narrative. After its clumsy affidavit request
and several losses in the federal litigation concerning the ALJs’
appointments, the SEC responded by indicating that it would
“modernize [its] rules of practice for administrative proceedings” by,
most importantly, extending discovery rights.257
For agencies with AJs, the partiality narrative — once it comes to
light — is likely to be much worse for reasons that should feel familiar
by now. Aside from invoking agency win rates in particular in-house
proceedings,258 parties can point to AJs’ proceedings, which are
typically less formal than ALJs’. They can point to the differences
between AJs’ appointment process, where the agency generally has
carte blanche in hiring those whom it thinks may be most
“cooperative” with the agency mission, and the OPM-limiting ALJhiring process. This hiring authority in and of itself may not be too
troubling because, after all, federal judges are selected, in part, based

254

See Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra note 149.
See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
256 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 111, at 1 (noting that Goodling testified before
the House of Representatives); Eric Lichtblau, Report Faults Aides in Hiring at Justice
Dept., N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/washington/
29justice.html.
257 Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative
Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015209.html.
258 See, e.g., McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 205-11 (reviewing
statistics concerning agency win rates in federal-employee whistleblower actions
before MSPB AJs, determining that agencies win in 95% of the cases, and concluding
that they are “astoundingly biased in favor of [agencies]”); see also McCarthy, MSPB
Judges, supra note 163, at 37, 40 (contrasting agency win rates in whistleblower
actions before AJs and ALJs, the latter of whom decide for employees in approximately
33% of cases).
255
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on how they are likely to rule.259 But then, they can point to how a
supermajority of AJs receives performance reviews (and potentially
bonuses) from the agencies that often appear before them, while
agencies are prohibited from reviewing (and giving bonuses) to ALJs.
They can point to how agencies can remove AJs at will or assign them
different duties, but those same agencies cannot do the same with
ALJs. In the end, the benefits that agencies garner from controlling AJs
exacerbate the appearance of AJs being in the agency’s pocket, and this
appearance creates costs for the agency by distracting it from
executing its mission. And the larger number of AJs would likely only
exacerbate those costs as compared to those of the SEC’s ALJ
proceedings.
This threat is not merely hypothetical. Federal courts of appeals lost
faith in IJs around the time of the Bush-era hiring and firing scandals.
Indeed, as one commenter put it, these courts “lambasted the work of
immigration judges.”260 The Seventh Circuit, in particular, led by the
eminent Judge Richard Posner reversed “a staggering 40 percent” of
orders from the Board of Immigration Appeals in 2005.261 The Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuits also noted their concern over IJ agency
adjudication.262 And most of the courts’ concerns related to the IJs’
bias and lack of professionalism.263 Agencies, in short, ignore ALJs at
their peril in seeking to accomplish their regulatory missions.
2.

Increasing Likelihood of Judicial Deference

Aside from improving appearances of impartiality, using ALJs and
formal adjudication increases the likelihood of courts giving agencies
interpretive primacy over ambiguous statutes and thus faring better on
judicial review. To obtain interpretive primacy, agencies must receive
Chevron, as opposed to Skidmore, deference. Chevron deference is

259 See Jackson, supra note 26, at 977-79 (2007) (arguing that the appointment of
Article III judges is, by design, political and discussing role of ideology in
appointments).
260 Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the Real ID Act’s Credibility
Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 663-64 (2007)
(discussing those courts’ impatience with IJs).
261 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.); see also
id. (“Our criticisms of the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been
severe.”).
262 See id. (collecting cases).
263 See id. (citing Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir.
2005)) (“[T]he [IJ’s] assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture . . . .”).
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generally understood to be more deferential to agencies because it
recognizes their authority to interpret reasonably ambiguous statutes
that they administer.264 With Skidmore deference, in contrast, courts
retain interpretive primacy, deferring to agencies’ views only when the
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade” convince it to do
so.265 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Mead Corp., has
identified two key matters, as relevant here, to determine generally
whether agencies have acted with the “force of law” and are thus
eligible for Chevron deference: whether Congress has bestowed
rulemaking or formal adjudication authority upon the agency, and
whether the agency has used that authority in promulgating the
interpretation at issue.266 Although some have criticized the Court’s
focus on procedural formality as a criterion for deference, procedural
formality is consistent with the view that administrative procedures
further congressional monitoring of agencies. Formal procedures
usually provide more visibility, transparency, and opportunities for
Congress to assert subtle pressure on agencies as to policy questions
than informal actions.267 In evaluating formality’s role in Chevron
eligibility, commenters and courts have generally focused on whether
agencies’ interpretations have the “force of law” when promulgated

264 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 (1984) (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial
Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 79 (2011) [hereinafter Studies
of Judicial Review] (“Since 2001, the Justices have engaged in a lively debate about the
circumstances in which [Chevron or Skidmore] applies. That debate indicates that all
Justices believe that the doctrines differ and that the Chevron doctrine is more
deferential . . . .”).
265 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
266 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-32 (2001) (“It is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law [to
which Chevron applies] when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference [has] reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication.” (internal citations omitted)).
267 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2043-44 (2011).
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through less formal “guidance” documents, such as agency manuals,
enforcement guidelines, or interpretive rules.268
But another, often-ignored issue lurks in the Chevron eligibility
analysis: whether agencies choose formal or informal adjudicatory
hearings. When agencies act through formal adjudication under the APA
and thus almost always use an ALJ, Mead provides that they are generally
eligible for Chevron deference. But the same is not true of informal
adjudication. In Mead itself, the Court refused, after determining that
Chevron did not apply, to defer to statutory interpretations arising from
informal adjudication.269 Instead, courts must engage in an indeterminate
inquiry as to whether the informal interpretation at issue is Chevroneligible.270 Thus, agencies can obtain heightened judicial review more
easily for issues of law by choosing ALJs.
With all of this said, one should not overstate the importance of
formal adjudication as a talisman for Chevron deference. It is, instead,
a useful tool for improving agencies’ chances of receiving Chevron
deference. First, formal adjudication is not necessary for Chevron
deference. Chevron can apply to certain relatively formalized hearings
presided over by AJs, even if they do not constitute “formal
adjudication.” For instance, courts apply Chevron deference to
decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), whose
members are AJs.271 Relatedly, formal adjudication may not be
sufficient for Chevron deference because not all courts extend Chevron
deference to ALJ decisions that did not undergo administrative

268 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2015)
[hereinafter Codifying Chevmore] (discussing courts’ confusion over which agency
actions have the force of law); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444-45 (2005) [hereinafter Muddled
Judicial Review] (focusing on how courts of appeals have implemented Mead when
agencies do not proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465,
468-70 (2013) (concentrating generally on whether IRS guidance documents have
force of law).
269 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-33.
270 See generally Bressman, Muddled Judicial Review, supra note 268, passim
(discussing the confusion that Mead has caused lower courts in determining when
informal action receives Chevron deference).
271 See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 530 (2003). An IJ’s determination without BIA review may
receive only Skidmore deference. See, e.g., Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d
915, 920-24 (9th Cir. 2006); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2d
Cir. 2005) (refusing to apply Chevron deference to an IJ decision that the BIA
summarily affirmed).
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review.272 Formal adjudication, accordingly, is not necessary or
sufficient for Chevron review, but it increases the likelihood of an
agency winning the “deference lottery.”273
Second, because empirical studies have found that agency win rates
under Chevron and Skidmore overlap, Chevron deference may not be as
important for agencies as other concerns in its cost-benefit calculus.
Dick Pierce, after summarizing several studies, noted that courts
affirmed agency action from 60% to 81.3% of the time under Chevron,
while they affirmed from 55.1% to 73.5% of the time under
Skidmore.274 But, as I have argued elsewhere, there are significant
reasons to evaluate the studies that create that overlap.275 For instance,
one should discount studies that found a lower win rate (64% or
65.2%) for agencies than other studies under Chevron (and thus made
Chevron look less useful to agencies) because they expressly
considered, respectively, only two “politically contentious” agencies276
or one court.277 And one should place a premium on a study that
found a lower agency win rate (60.4%) under Skidmore (and thus
suggested that Chevron is more beneficial to agencies) because, as it
was the only study to consider Skidmore cases after Mead reinvigorated
the dormant Skidmore doctrine in 2001, it is more probative of current
judicial practice.278 With these qualifications in mind, the differences
between Chevron and Skidmore deference become more meaningful
and demonstrate that choosing formality provides a greater likelihood
of receiving deference on judicial review.

272 See Brendan C. Selby, Internal Agency Review, Authoritativeness, and Mead, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 575 n.248 (2013) (“The law on the extent to which such
lower-level actors may receive Chevron deference for decisions conducted through
formal adjudication is unsettled.”).
273 See Christopher J. Walker, Response, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 79 (2013) (discussing when agencies should invest in formalities
to obtain deference).
274 Pierce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 264, at 85.
275 See Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, supra note 268, at 67.
276 See id. (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848 (2006)
(focusing study on “two important agencies known for producing politically
contentious decisions: the EPA and the NLRB”)).
277 See Pierce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 264, at 84 (citing Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168, 2182 tbl.3
(1998) (considering D.C. Circuit decisions)).
278 See id. (citing Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007)).
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Increasing Likelihood of Absolute Official Immunity

Choosing ALJs can also bestow on agencies another limited benefit:
increasing the likelihood of obtaining official immunity for
administrative adjudicators. Losing litigants in administrative
proceedings may assert constitutional or statutory claims against
administrative adjudicators based on, among other things, due process
(bias), the First Amendment, or the Fourth Amendment.279 To keep
agency adjudicators focused on deciding cases and able to avoid
discovery, agencies should prefer that their adjudicators have absolute
immunity, as opposed to qualified immunity. The former protects
adjudicators from even bad faith, intentional, or malicious legal
violations, while the latter only extends to good faith misconduct that
does not violate a clearly established right.280 Aside from scienter
concerns, the key difference between these two immunities is that
absolute immunity allows an immune defendant to escape the lawsuit
before discovery, while qualified immunity permits disputes over
issues of fact.281 For agencies, absolute immunity shields their
adjudicators from having to worry about collateral litigation at all,
even if those adjudicators are extremely likely to prevail on the merits.
ALJs have absolute immunity. In a lawsuit against an ALJ in the
Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou
held that ALJs are entitled to absolute immunity from suit.282 They
were so entitled because of ALJs’ quasi-judicial function, the
procedures required for formal adjudication, and, “more importantly,”
the APA’s structure that assures ALJs’ “independent judgment on the
evidence before [them], free from pressures by the parties or other
officials within the agency.”283 Those structures are the ones that are
familiar by now: separation of functions, absence of agency
supervision, prohibitions on ex parte contacts, limits on removing
ALJs, and another agency’s control over ALJs’ pay.284

279 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (discussing causes of
action brought against agency officials, including an ALJ).
280 Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 53, 54.
281 See Andrew Horowitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police
Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1314 (1998) (discussing the key
difference between absolute and qualified immunity, as noted by the Supreme Court
in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976)).
282 Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-13.
283 Id. at 513.
284 See id. at 513-14.
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But whether AJs receive absolute immunity is far from certain.
Notably, of course, AJs do not share with ALJs the attributes that the
Court found “most important.” The Supreme Court in Cleavinger v.
Saxner refused to grant absolute immunity to prison officials who
adjudicated inmate infractions because the hearings provided fewer
procedural safeguards than in Butz and because of the officers’ lack of
independence.285 The Court distinguished these officials from those
who are “professional hearing officers, as are [ALJs].”286 Although the
term “professional hearing officers” could include federal AJs, the
Court’s distinctions suggest that the term does not always do so. The
Court noted that the prison officials at issue were, “albeit no longer of
the rank and file, temporarily diverted from their usual duties,”
subordinate to the warden who reviewed the decisions, and colleagues
with the officer who lodges the charge and who will often provide
testimony that the presiding official must review for credibility.287
Many federal AJs have a similar hue. “[A]lbeit no longer part of the
rank and file,” many AJs are not full-time hearing officers, they are
subordinate to those more senior in the agency, and agency colleagues
file charges and may serve as witnesses. On the other hand, absolute
immunity may be available for AJs who have no other agency duties,
who are supervised by those who do not enforce the matter or review
the decision, and who preside over nonenforcement hearings that are
unlikely to have colleagues bring charges or serve as witnesses.
This immunity issue may have largely escaped agencies’ attention
because, in the few cases to address the issue, courts ignore the
“independence” inquiry. Some federal district courts have held that IJs
are entitled to absolute immunity.288 But they have done so after
quickly concluding only that the executive official acts in a quasijudicial function. They do not consider the “more important” inquiry,
the IJs’ independence.289 Likewise, numerous courts have granted
285

See generally Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
Id. at 203-04.
287 Id. at 204.
288 See, e.g., Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1290 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
(“An immigration judge is protected by absolute immunity.” (citing Butz)); Alyshah v.
Hunter, No. 1:06-cv-0931-TWT, 2006 WL 2644910, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2006);
Hernandez-Ortez v. Godinez, No. 88 C 5925, 1988 WL 129997, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
30, 1988). One decision stated without any analysis in dicta that “it is settled law that
administrative judges and agency prosecutors are shielded by absolute immunity from
claims arising from quasi-judicial administrative proceedings.” See Herbst v. U.S.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 98-civ-5533(LMM), 1999 WL 1052461, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1999).
289 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 483.
286
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parole-board members absolute immunity,290 but, once again, without
considering the “more important” inquiry.291
This judicial preterition may be coming to an end. A recent
challenge to the immunity of the U.S. Parole Commissioners led one
prominent judge to call for denying them absolute immunity. In a
concurring opinion in Taylor v. Reilly, D.C. Circuit Judge Brett
Kavanaugh argued that absolute immunity was not available because
the Parole Commissioners, as adjudicators who were removable at will
by the President, were not independent.292 Other litigants have noticed
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion and are attempting to return the “more
important” independence inquiry to the immunity analysis.293 A larger
point for agencies is that they should carefully consider the power to
remove executive officials at will as a useful tool for control; with
control comes not only due process but also perhaps immunity
concerns. Moreover, focusing on adjudicatory independence makes
sense. To the extent that absolute immunity should be rare because of
its power to immunize public actors who cause private harms,
focusing on indicia of an impartial and fair adjudicatory process make
agencies earn their great privilege by attempting to limit the instances
in which the adjudicator would have incentive to harm private parties.
As with judicial deference, one should not overstate the significance
of absolute immunity for agencies. Immunity for agency adjudicators
may be of marginal significance for many agencies. First, many
agencies — unlike prisons — may be unlikely to encounter parties
whose litigiousness renders absolute immunity especially valuable.
Second, even if adjudicators have absolute immunity, the agency itself
may still face discovery burdens because agency heads generally have
only qualified immunity.294 That said, with the judicial reconsideration
of which adjudicators should be absolutely immune and regulated
parties’ interest in collateral lawsuits (perhaps especially in
enforcement proceedings, where independence is especially
290

See, e.g., Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200-01 (collecting appellate decisions).
See, e.g., Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1983); Sellars v.
Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally United States ex rel.
Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982) (ignoring independence in immunity
analysis of parole board).
292 See Taylor v. Reilly, 685 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
293 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014)
(noting the argument); Brief for Erica Hashimoto et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Harris v. Fulwood, No. 13-5343 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (arguing, based
on Taylor, that parole hearing officers are not entitled to absolute immunity).
294 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-508 (1978).
291
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valuable295),296 the use of ALJs allows agencies to limit disruptive
litigation.
B. Exaggerated Benefits of Choosing AJs
Subpart A demonstrated that agencies give up benefits when they
choose AJs to control agency proceedings. This subpart B argues that
the remaining benefits of choosing AJs over ALJs are overstated. Not
only are these benefits — cost savings, informality, and expertise —
not as beneficial as they may first appear, but they lose their luster
when compared to the benefits that ALJs provide. Nevertheless, where
AJs provide benefits that ALJs do not, this subpart considers how the
administrative state can bestow these benefits on agencies, even
without congressional intervention.
1.

Overstated Cost Savings

Perhaps most surprisingly, contrary to common perception, AJs are
not always less expensive or, at least, significantly less expensive than
ALJs.297 Three examples make the point.
First, the 1992 Frye Survey reported that approximately 7% of all
government-employed AJs (165) were paid either “supergrades” (i.e.,
GS-16 through GS-18) or were part of the Senior Executive Service
(“SES”),298 which provide higher starting and capped salaries than
ALJs receive.299 Ten years later, the Limon Updated Survey reported
that SES pay grades are common throughout the administrative state,

295 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1048-50 (arguing that independence is
especially important in enforcement actions).
296 One commenter has expressly called for biased AJs to receive no immunity at
all. See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 227 (“The ability of biased
administrative judges to shape and distort the record must be curbed. Administrative
judges found guilty of abusing their offices should enjoy no judicial immunity.”).
297 See, e.g., Kapnik, supra note 152, at 1544-45 (“AJs can cost significantly less
than ALJs . . . .”); McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 215 (“Because
administrative judges are paid far less than administrative law judges, agencies prefer
them . . . .”); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345 (“As a result, whereas the ALJs
as a group rival the federal trial judiciary and adjuncts in both number and
compensation, . . . [AJs] decide[] more cases, but do[] so with less prestige,
compensation and job security.”).
298 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B. Some agencies did not report pay grades or the
number of AJs who were paid at each grade. See id. at 349-51.
299 Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary Table 2015-ES, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
15Tables/exec/html/ES.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
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although it failed to indicate the number of AJs receiving SES pay.300
Eleven of 36 agencies that conduct oral hearings with AJs (as listed in
the Limon Updated Survey chart) reported having at least some AJs
receiving SES pay.301
Second, even of General Service AJs, at least approximately 8% were
identified in the 1992 Frye Survey as GS-15 employees (the highest
regular GS grade),302 whose salaries were only slightly lower than
ALJs’.303 The Limon Updated Survey reveals that GS-15 pay is also
common, although again without identifying the precise number of
AJs at this grade. But importantly, the largest number of reported AJs
from one agency on the Limon Updated Survey — 1,000 patent
examiners that work in the Commerce Department — were GS-15,304
constituting nearly one-third of all 3,370 reported AJs.
Third, as leading scholars noted generally in the early 1990s,305 a
growing number of AJs are paid on unique pay scales with pay that is
commensurate to or better than ALJs’.306 For instance, Administrative
Appeals Judges’ basic pay (“AA”) is identical to ALJs’.307 The more
than 250 IJs308 have higher base salaries (“IJ”) than ALJs.309 Likewise,
AJs with “Senior-Level and Scientific or Professional Positions” (“SL/
ST”)310 or AJs who serve as Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”)
300

See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6.
See id.
302 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B. Agencies reported 185 AJs as GS-15 employees
(or approximately 8% of the 2,228 GS employees). Several other agencies submitted
information indicating that their AJs were paid between various levels; three of those
reporting agencies indicated that some unreported number of their AJs were GS-15.
303 GS-15 employees’ starting salaries are approximately $102,000, as compared to
ALJs’ starting salaries of approximately $106,000. Compare 2015-GS Table, supra note
170, with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167 (listing starting basic pay at $105,900).
304 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1 (under “U.S. Department of Commerce”
entry).
305 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1055-56.
306 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 3.
307 Compare Salary Table No. 2015-AAJ, OPM.GOV, http://www.opm.gov/policydata-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2015/AAJ.pdf (last visited
Mar. 29, 2016), with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167.
308 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“The Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge . . . provides overall program direction . . . for approximately
250 immigration judges in 57 immigration courts . . . .”).
309 Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2014 Immigration Judge Pay Rates,
JUSTICE.GOV,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/05/28/2014IJ
PayTable.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
310 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6 (listing, for example, positions in the
Department of the Interior and Health and Human Services).
301
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receive basic pay that is significantly higher than ALJs’.311 But perhaps
even more surprising, AJs on the Board of Contract Appeals — used in
several agencies312 — and for OSHA313 have basic starting pay (CA-1–3
and Executive Schedule (“EX”), respectively) that exceeds ALJs’
highest possible basic pay.314
After accounting for AJs under the AA, APJ, CA, EX, GS-15315 or
higher, IJ, SES, and SL/ST pay scales (in all of their bureaucratic,
abbreviated glory), the cost-savings narrative surrounding AJs begins
to lose force. For example, 1,618 of the 3,370 reported AJs — or 48%
— are paid at levels better than, the same as, or only slightly lower
than new ALJs.316 Moreover, this number only includes those AJs
whom the agency identified as being paid at these grades. It does not
include the numerous instances — more than 250 potentially affected
AJs — in which the agency reported that some indefinite number of
AJs was paid at these rates (and some indefinite number at lower
rates).317 Accordingly, this data suggest that AJs may be meaningfully
cheaper than ALJs only, at best, approximately half the time.

311 Compare Salary Table No. 2014-SL/ST, OPM.GOV, http://www.opm.gov/policydata-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2014/SLST.pdf (last visited
Mar. 29, 2016) (listing basic pay minimum as $120,749 for SL/ST positions), and
USPTO 2014 AD Pay Plan, COMMERCE.GOV, http://hr.commerce.gov/Employees/
Compensation/PROD01_010302 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing minimum salary
for Administrative Patent Judges as $135,842), with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167
(listing starting basic pay at approximately $106,000).
312 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6 (listing Board of Contract Appeals
under Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing & Urban Development, Interior,
Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the General Service Administration; U.S.
Government Printing Office; NASA; and U.S. Postal Service).
313 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 5.
314 See Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary Table No. 2015-BCA, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
15Tables/exec/html/BCA.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing lowest basic pay for other
Board of Contract Appeals members as $149,178); Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary
Table No. 2015-EX, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/
salaries-wages/salary-tables/15Tables/exec/html/EX.aspx (last visited July 22, 2015) (listing
lowest basic pay as $148,700).
315 This account includes 25 AJs for the General Accounting Office’s Office of the
General Counsel. The GAO reported “25-30” AJs who were paid at the “SG-15
Equivalent.” See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 2.
316 See infra App. A (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by pay grades
described above).
317 See infra App. B (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey to isolate
instances when agencies did not report indefinite number of AJs at high rates
described above and calculating 268 relevant AJ positions (and 10 part-time
positions)).
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There’s more. The cost savings from paying the remaining 1,755 AJs
— approximately half of all reported AJs — is not as significant as it
may first appear. Of those remaining AJs, the reporting agencies
identified the pay scale for 603 fulltime or “contract” AJs (as opposed
to simply identifying that an AJ was part of the general service).318
Assuming that each of the 603 AJs is paid at the lowest identified
grade at 2015 rates (and thus assuming the largest possible —
although unlikely — difference in cost between AJs and ALJs), the
salary savings comes to less than $30 million or less than 1/37,000 of
the 2015 $1.1 trillion discretionary budget.319 For some agencies, the
increase is an infinitesimal fraction of their budgets. For instance, the
Energy Department would pay less than $400,000 to convert its 19 AJs
into ALJs or approximately 0.0015 of 1% of its 2014 budget of more
than $27 billion.320 Even Veterans Affairs, which would have the
largest additional costs of approximately $15,500,000 by converting to
ALJs, would have to allocate only approximately 0.025 of 1% of its
2014 budget of approximately $63 billion to increased salary costs.
The only other agency with more than $3 million in additional costs in
converting AJs to ALJs is the EEOC, with approximately $6 million.321
Notably, many agencies — such as U.S. Railroad Retirement Board,

318 See infra App. C (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by agencies with
AJs at identifiable GS grades). I did not include those AJs for which the agencies
simply identified them as being part of the General Service because it was too unclear
what the AJs’ salaries were.
319 See Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, Discretionary Spending,
NATIONALPRIORITIES.ORG, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget101/spending (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
320 Office of Management and Budget, Historical tables, Table 5.4, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
When calculating the cost savings, I used the starting base salary for ALJs of $105,900,
as opposed to the approximate figure of $106,000 that I used throughout this article
for ease of reference. See infra App. C.
321 A more recent budget analysis for the EEOC suggests that my figure for the
EEOC is significantly larger than a more realistic projection. I arrived at this
approximately $6 million figure based on the EEOC having 111 AJs and presuming
that they were paid on the GS-11 scale. See infra App. C. The Administrative
Conference of the United States considered in 2014 the likely budgetary effect if the
EEOC converted its 95 AJs who hear certain federal-employee discrimination claims
to ALJs. It predicted that “the agency’s annual personnel costs—in terms of salaries,
benefits, and other related costs—would likely rise between $1.1 million and $2.5
million in a given year over a ten-year period. Similarly, on an annualized basis,
personnel costs increases from use of ALJs would likely be $2.1 million per year under
the primary (baseline) scenario.” ACUS EEOC RPT., supra note 143, at 4. The report
noted that almost all of the EEOC AJs were paid on the GS-14 scale. See id. at 43.
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the Federal Maritime Commission, the EPA, and the Department of
Energy — would have additional salary costs under $1 million.322
This is not to say that cost savings are irrelevant. To paraphrase the
late Senator Dirksen, “Twenty-nine million dollars here, twenty-nine
million dollars there — pretty soon it adds up to real money.”323 But
one must put this salary savings into perspective, not only with agency
and federal discretionary spending but also with the benefits that ALJs
bring to agencies. Likewise, this is not to say that the total savings
could not be more than I indicate here once seniority and locality pay
and benefits are accounted for, but, to my knowledge, this kind of
granular data is not available. Moreover, this is not to say that AJs are
always cheaper than ALJs; they’re not. The point is, instead, that one
should not exaggerate the cost savings of AJs, especially in light of the
benefits of converting, when possible, to ALJs.
To be sure, the money for ALJ salaries would have to come from
often-overtaxed agency budgets, meaning that money now spent on
other things must instead be directed to ALJ salaries. Although cost is
often relevant to due process, expense is not a trump card.324 Even if
expense is germane to impartiality analysis,325 the amount of money at
issue is comparatively small, as discussed above, and the expenditure
furthers the compelling goals of protecting the agency forum from the
unconstitutional appearance of partiality and ameliorating the agency’s
ability to further its own agenda with less distraction. In other words,
this movement of a comparatively modest amount of money to ALJs is
not an empty expenditure. Moreover, I take no position on how high
ALJ salaries should be. Perhaps, contrary to longstanding calls from
ALJs,326 they should be lower. But Congress’s increased reliance on
separate pay scales that exceed ALJ salaries for certain AJs and on GS15 salaries that are commensurate to ALJs’ salaries suggest that
Congress has set appropriate salaries to attract qualified ALJs.

322 See App. C (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by agencies with AJs
at identifiable GS grades).
323 Scalia, supra note 43, at 69-70 (arguing that savings under prior ALJ-pay
scheme, even if relatively modest, still supported adhering to it).
324 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
325 Although the court frequently considers costs when determining the extent of
procedure that are due, see, e.g., id., I am not aware of the Court relying upon notions
of cost when determining whether unconstitutional appearances of partiality exist.
326 See, e.g., Robin J. Arzt et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of
the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, 29 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 107-10 (2009).
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Overstated Informality and Efficiency

Agencies may also not gain as much informality and efficiency as it
first appears by eschewing ALJs and formal adjudication under the
APA. Formal adjudication generally requires an ALJ to preside over
hearings327 and provides independence for the ALJ from ex parte
comments, agency oversight, and the obligation to perform other
agency duties.328 Participants are entitled to the following: notice of
the proceedings,329 briefing,330 legal counsel,331 presentation of their
case orally or in writing (except that agencies can require written
submissions in certain benefits and licensing matters), crossexamination as necessary,332 submission of findings of fact and law,
submission of exceptions to findings, and a reasoned decision with
findings of material facts and legal issues supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole.333 For three key reasons, these
attributes of formal adjudication are unlikely to interfere significantly
with agency efficiency.
First. Because many agency hearings are already formalized,
additional APA requirements for formal adjudication may minimally
affect efficiency. As a starting point, oral hearings, by their nature, are
very likely to include many characteristics of formal adjudication,
including notice, written and oral presentation of one’s case, legal
counsel, and reasoned, written opinions. Indeed, Frye noted more
than twenty years ago that agencies have moved to more formalized
proceedings in federal-employment and enforcement matters that
incorporate numerous formal-adjudication procedures,334 and ACUS
noted in 1992, when attempting to convince Congress to require
formal adjudication in more proceedings,335 that “informal hearings
327

5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
Id. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (2012).
329 Id. § 554(b).
330 Id. § 554(c).
331 Id. § 555(b) (2012).
332 Id. § 556(d).
333 Id. §§ 557(c), 556(d), 706(2)(E) (2012).
334 See Frye, supra note 3, at 333 (discussing increased formality in federalemployment disputes); id. at 275 (“All [immigration, passport-and-nationality, and
security-clearance cases] incorporate a substantial number of the procedural
protections of sections 556 and 557.”).
335 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058-59 (“Congress should consider expanding
the category of cases where ALJs are required . . . . Congress should focus on the
following factors: (1) Whether the cases heard and decided by the AJs involve
potentially serious curtailment of individual interests (‘Serious curtailment of
individual interests’ should be defined to include those cases that include penalties,
328
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contain most of the ingredients of an APA formal hearing.”336 As one
of many examples, immigration proceedings had adopted “most of
[formal adjudication’s] procedures,” including even separation of
functions to provide IJs some independence.337 Likewise, the
Department of Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals decades ago
recognized the value of giving their AJs separate space and separated
functions from others in the agency,338 and agencies have moved to
give more independence and sole-adjudicative function to AJs with
high caseloads.339 In other examples, the Department of Defense
provides nearly formal adjudication for those facing the denial of
security clearance,340 and the Department of Agriculture uses very
formal proceedings (satisfying all or nearly all of the ingredients
mentioned in Goldberg v. Kelly, and essentially the same as formal
adjudication) in several adjudications.341
Relatedly, using ALJs with more indicia of impartiality can also
increase efficiency and cost-reducing efforts. Providing a more
impartial tribunal “may reduce . . . the demand . . . for additional
procedural ingredients such as confrontation, a transcript, and oral
presentation.”342 Parties, too, may be less likely to seek appeal of
adverse decisions when the decision is reasoned, addresses material
arguments, and comes from an impartial decision-maker.
To be sure, the transition would not be nearly costless in every
instance. As other studies have demonstrated,343 the administrative
state is balkanized with numerous varieties of hearings, although the
trend is towards increased formality. Some adjudications may have
exceptional need to exploit certain values that are anathema to formal
adjudication, such as the need for ex parte contacts in matters of
sanctions, or other significant restrictions on personal freedom.’)”). ACUS had
recommended that Congress require cases concerning “substantial impact on personal
liberties or freedom,” “criminal-like culpability,” “sanctions with substantial economic
effect,” or findings of discrimination use formal adjudication. 1992 ACUS RPT., supra
note 49, at 12.
336 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1053-54.
337 Frye, supra note 3, at 276 (listing procedures created by statute and regulation).
338 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 787 (citing interviews with
Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals).
339 See Frye, supra note 3, at 271.
340 See id. at 279.
341 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 760-65.
342 Id. at 751 (citing Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1279, 1289 (1975)).
343 See generally Frye, supra note 3 (discussing in significant detail the kinds of AJ
adjudication); see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 843-75; Verkuil, Informal
Adjudication, supra note 35, at 757-79.
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national security or much more limited oral-hearing rights when
matters of high volume and low complexity can be handled equally as
fairly in writing (and do not otherwise fall under the APA’s writtenhearing exception for benefits and licensing). (Yet, even here, agencies
can work to provide these necessary AJs with independence with
protection from at-will removal and separation of functions.) Or
Congress may, in extremely rare circumstances, already provide
certain AJs, such as the judges on the Civilian Board of Contract
Appeals, with similar accoutrements of independence that ALJs have,
significantly reducing any lingering concerns over limits on other APA
on-the-record protections.344 Or certain, rare agency hearings for
which parties can seek completely de novo judicial proceedings may
gain little from formalized proceedings.345 Likewise, some agencies
may not have the discretion under their enabling acts to choose formal
adjudication and ALJs, such as when Congress has created a unique
adjudicatory process and named adjudicators like “Immigration
Judges” or “Administrative Patent Judges.” Those agencies would need
to not only consider the benefits of formal adjudication and ALJs, but
also seek congressional authorization to hire ALJs. And moving to
formal adjudication will certainly have some limited transition costs,
but these are short-term and unlikely to prove onerous for agencies
that have already moved towards formalized proceedings. My point
here is not that agencies should or can choose formal adjudication in
every case. Instead, my point is that in numerous cases, the move to
formal adjudication — as others have previously requested, to no
avail, that Congress require346 — is not as onerous or inefficient as
agencies may reactively contend.
Second. Formal adjudication is not as strict as it sounds. As Bill
Funk has pointed out, despite agencies’ protestations that formal
adjudication is “too costly and time consuming, . . . no empirical
support [exists for] . . . such an indictment of APA adjudication.”347
344 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (2012) (providing judges on the Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals the same appointment and removal protections as ALJs). Although
these judges must be “selected and appointed to serve in the same manner” as ALJs,
id., agencies have interpreted this statutory language as to permit them (not the OPM)
to use procedures similar to those of the OPM to select ALJs. See VERKUIL ET AL., supra
note 3, at 950-51. The OPM, for its part, has indicated that it does not have authority
to appoint these judges.
345 See, e.g., ACUS EEOC RPT., supra note 143, at 13-14 (considering certain EEOC
hearings for federal employees that are subject to de novo judicial proceedings and
noting the APA’s exception from formal adjudication for de novo proceedings).
346 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058-59.
347 Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 892.
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The APA permits flexibility in formal adjudication.348 For instance,
agencies generally can set pleading rules,349 regulate amici,350 enter
consent decrees,351 grant summary judgment,352 limit depositions,353
compel meaningful settlement conferences,354 grant ALJs other
authority to assist with case management,355 exclude “irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence,”356 limit crossexamination, engage in ex parte contacts for certain matters,357 limit
hearings to written submissions in certain high-volume matters
(claims for money or benefits, and applications for initial licenses),358
and even forgo adversarial (as opposed to inquisitorial) hearings with
lawyers for both private parties and the government.359 Frye — who
served as both an AJ and an ALJ — opined that the only significant
power that agencies surrender is the ability to compile the formal
record that must support the final agency order.360 At legislative
hearings concerning SSA adjudication, law professor Victor
Rosenblum testified on a point that agencies (and perhaps courts)
have forgotten: “[t]he focus of the APA was not on judicialization but
on fairness and impartiality in wielding administrative skills and
responsibilities.”361
Third. Transferring hearing duties from AJs with other duties to
ALJs with no other duties does not mean that the ALJs will be
underutilized. Recall that some AJs have other duties, suggesting that
348

See id.
5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (2012).
350 See id. § 554(c).
351 See id. § 554(c)(2).
352 See id. § 554(e); see also William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work? —
Using Informal Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
1, 65 (1993).
353 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (2012).
354 See id. § 556(c)(6), (c)(8).
355 See id. § 556(c)(11).
356 See id. § 556(d).
357 See id. § 554(d)(2).
358 See id. § 556(d).
359 See Wolfe, supra note 138, at 218 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC. OF THE COMM.
ON WAYS & MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY
AND ISSUE PAPER 8 (Comm. Print 1979)) (discussing views of then-Director of the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (for social-security claims), Robert Trachtenberg, that
APA does not require adversarial hearings or “highly ‘judicialized’ hearing[s]”).
360 Frye, supra note 3, at 268 n.14.
361 Wolfe, supra note 138, at 218 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC. OF THE COMM. ON
WAYS & MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND
ISSUE PAPER 8-9 (Comm. Print 1979)).
349

1702

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:1643

the agency does not have a sufficient number of hearings to keep them
occupied with hearings alone. But this concern can be largely
addressed in two ways. For agencies that have more than one
employee with shared duties, agencies can consolidate the hearing
responsibilities so that fewer employees have hearing duties. Swapping
those employees with ALJs would lead to only whatever additional
costs arise from pay costs, if any, and any additional or new costs
associated with reimbursing the OPM for administering the ALJ exam
(which are not otherwise offset by the agency’s cost savings in having
the OPM handle hiring).362 For agencies whose low number of
hearings warrants only a part-time ALJ,363 Congress permits those
agencies to share ALJs for occasional or temporary use.364
Accordingly, the case for informality and inefficiency is not as
strong as may be supposed. With the already formalized nature of
many agency proceedings, the APA’s flexibility, and strategies for
hiring only as many ALJs as necessary, formal adjudication is not
agencies’ bête noir.
3.

Overstated Expertise

Although agencies’ reliance on expertise to justify AJs is, like other
agency arguments, overwrought, it provides their best argument. As to
the overwrought point, ALJs are not as inexpert as agencies may think.
ALJs gain expertise on the job. The idea of committing ALJs to
particular agencies (instead of creating an ALJ Corps, as some states
have) is to permit them to gain expertise in a particular agency’s
regulatory regime.365 Learning statutory and regulatory schemes
362 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203 (2015) (“Each agency employing [ALJs] must reimburse
OPM for the cost of developing and administering the [ALJ] examination. Each
agency is charged a pro rata share of the examination cost, based on the actual
number of [ALJs] the agency employs.”). In 2012, the OPM assessed agencies a fee of
$1,633 per ALJ employed. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
CONG. RESPONSE RPT., INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS WITH THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SERVICES 6 (2013), available at
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-05-12-22144.pdf.
363 Frye noted in his study that, with the exception of certain Veteran Affairs
officers who were not included in the Limon Updated Survey, “while the caseload of
presiding officers with other duties is significant, the tendency to limit their
responsibilities to case types with a low caseload is pronounced.” Frye, supra note 3,
at 270. The Limon Updated Survey, contrary to the 1992 Frye Survey, did not identify
the number of AJs with other duties.
364 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012).
365 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1042-44 (discussing virtues and vices of the
ALJ-corps model).
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relatively quickly is not new for lawyers and judges, and generalist
ALJs can rely on lawyers (who very likely appear in most oral hearings
and file most briefings) to guide them. Recall, too, that ALJs are
evaluated based on their legal experience and must pass an
examination to qualify for the list of three, indicating that they are
intelligent, seasoned lawyers who can learn a regulatory regime
quickly.366 In fact, in one of the recent challenges to SEC ALJs, the
district court noted that the ALJ at issue has a “distinguished
biography,” including earning his undergraduate degree in physics
from Yale, earning his law degree from Harvard Law School, serving as
a federal law clerk, serving as an Assistant United States Attorney, and
working in an intellectual-property private practice.367 This ALJ may
not be atypical because others have noted, decades ago, that the ALJ
corps “in education, training, and experience . . . [is] no less qualified
than bankruptcy judges and magistrates, if not members of the federal
bench.”368
Not all agency adjudications, moreover, would appear to require
significant technical expertise that cannot be learned on the job. For
instance, agriculture, employment and labor, education, socialsecurity, and veterans cases do not seem to require significant
technical expertise that a successful lawyer could not acquire relatively
quickly. Indeed, the SSA and HHS have noted that they have generally
been pleased with their ALJ candidates.369 To the extent that limited
technical expertise is necessary, the APA provides numerous ways of
providing it to the ALJ: oral hearings, expert witnesses, and party
agreement and proposed factual findings. If additional regulatory
expertise is needed, lawyers can assist the ALJ in framing the issues
and providing technical background.
Nonetheless, some agency adjudications will greatly benefit from
adjudicators with significant technical or regulatory expertise. For
instance, patent and tax matters — two of the areas that had the
366 See id. at 1044 (“After a few years’ experience, [ALJs] are well-positioned to
understand and to apply the complicated maze of statutes, regulations, and agency
policies that govern the disputes they adjudicate.”).
367 Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
368 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344.
369 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED
CULTURES: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8-10 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that SSA and Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) were pleased with quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought changes
— such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates — to ensure that the
appointment considered specialized knowledge).
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largest number of AJs in Limon’s Updated Survey — are not for the
uninitiated or even for those without certain hard-science
undergraduate degrees. The problem for agencies that need expert
adjudicators is that the OPM’s current ALJ-hiring model does not
account for subject-matter expertise.370 For decades, OPM routinely
permitted “selective certification,” which allowed agencies to hire
candidates with technical expertise who qualified as eligible but were
not within the top-three scoring candidates.371 But it has refused to do
so since the early 1980s, likely because of concerns that agencies were
seeking to hire ALJs with a more “pro-enforcement attitude.”372 The
result of selective certification’s desuetude is that it unintentionally
furthered concerns of adjudicator bias: agencies were further
incentivized to turn away from generalist ALJs in favor of technically
expert AJs, groomed as part of the agency’s own staff and within the
agency’s continued control.373
Certain agencies continue to request selective certification — from
the OPM or Congress — in vain.374 ALJs, for their part, have
370 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1009 (“[The ALJ-hiring process] does not
[account for] whether a new ALJ has specialized experience in the regulatory or
beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”); Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra
note 149 (quoting report stating that the SEC “has not hired a single [ALJ] who had
directly relevant experience or expertise related to the federal securities laws” in thirty
years); Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà
Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 484 (2007)
(noting that agencies cannot seek out candidates with experience).
371 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 5; Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges,
supra note 58, at 117.
372 OPM, EXAMINATION ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 318 at 8 (1984); see also 5 C.F.R.
§ 332.404 (2015) (requiring agency to select from the “highest three eligibles”). The
concern of agencies stacking their ALJ corps with former staffers was very real. A 1969
ACUS report found that during one five-year period, “52 of 66 ALJs appointed by the
agencies utilizing selective certification had been previously employed on the staffs of
those agencies.” Christopher E. Austin, Note, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the
Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 768, 785 n.103 (1982) (quoting ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR 1976–1978, at 12 (1980)).
373 Cf. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication, supra note 147, at 75-76 (arguing that agencies
would be even more likely to avoid ALJs if the ALJ-corps model were adopted because
ALJs would not be assigned to particular agencies).
374 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 6 (noting that International Trade Commission
(“ITC”) and the SSA have sought selective certification); Arzt et al., supra note 326, at
101-02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal Trade Commission both sought legislative
permission to certify selectively). But see GAO-10-14, supra note 369, at 8-10 (reporting
that SSA and HHS were pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought
changes — such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates — to ensure that the
appointment considered specialized knowledge); Social Security Testimony Before
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continued to oppose selective certification and sought to retain their
generalist hue.375 But this stalemate over selective certification is not
inevitable. A more limited form of selective certification can
adequately address both sides’ concerns.
To account for necessary technical expertise, the OPM should first
permit selective certification if the agency can make a showing that
technical expertise (meaning expertise in the industry, science, or
comparatively complicated regulatory regime) is necessary for ALJs. A
good starting place would be those instances in which Congress has
itself generally indicated some form of specialized expertise in
hiring376 or specialized adjudication for the subject matter at issue
outside of the agencies themselves: tax (Article I Tax Court),
government contracts (Article I Court of Federal Claims and Federal
Circuit jurisdiction), patent (Federal Circuit jurisdiction), military
matters (United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Services), and
Trade (Article III Court of International Trade). This congressional
confirmation provides an objective, clear basis for determining
whether expertise is a compelling value in the particular subject area
at issue, and thus it should limit OPM and ALJs’ concerns of agencies
seeking biased ALJs when expertise is not necessary for the
adjudications at issue.
To account for fears of agency in-house hiring, OPM should limit the
selective registers to require balance among the agency’s ALJ force.
OPM, for example, could require that no more than, say, 25% of the
agency’s ALJ corps have previously worked within the agency. Such a
balancing requirement is similar to the partisan balancing requirements
that are ubiquitous throughout the federal administrative state377 and
that apply to European constitutional courts.378 This balancing
Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., & the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law,
114th Cong. (July 11, 2011) (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_071111.html (noting SSA’s
“positive working relationship with OPM” and the improved quality of hiring, but still
seeking “agency-specific selection criteria”).
375 See Arzt et al., supra note 326, at 103; Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra note
149 (quoting Erin Wirth, president of the Fed. Admin. Law Judges Conference, as
arguing that ALJs are generalists who do not need expertise in their fields).
376 See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that certain members of the Board
of Contract Appeals have “at least 5 years of experience in public contract law”).
377 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the
Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 962-72 (2015).
378 See Mary L. Volvansek, Appointing Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 363, 384 (2007) (“European constitutional courts, whose judges are named
through shared appointments and a balance of partisan quotas, were created in
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requirement recognizes that agency employees have useful expertise
and experience, that they may be extremely able neutrals, and that
agency service should not disincentivize those with expertise and
adjudicatory aspirations from working for agencies. The other ALJs can
come from lawyers that regularly appear before the agency and lawyers
from other agencies.379 If agencies still eschew ALJ hiring under such a
balancing regime, it only causes their argument for expertise to look like
subterfuge for bias.
To be sure, some employee-nepotism may remain, but the concern
should be mitigated. The in-house employees must still qualify
through their test scores as “eligible,”380 although they must no longer
be within the top three scores.381 Likewise, a balancing requirement
may be most effective with multimember bodies, where members
exchange views and vote on policy matters, instead of single-judge
proceedings. But a balancing requirement can have a salutary effect on
agency culture and nonbinding ALJ precedent. The supermajority of
ALJs from outside of the agency can be expected to create an impartial
judicial culture in which the former in-house employees (now with
protection from at-will removal) are integrated, much as it is within
the judicial branch when former prosecutors, public defenders,
plaintiff’s lawyers, and defense attorneys become neutrals.382
Moreover, the ALJs from outside of the agency should have an
outsized effect on agency precedent. Even if that precedent is not
binding on other ALJs,383 it provides persuasive precedent that other
ALJs will either attempt to remain consistent with or attempt to
distinguish — all similar to how federal district judges within the
same district interact with one another and consider each other’s
nonbinding decisions.
This proposal does not require congressional intervention. Like
most agencies’ discretion under Chevron to choose ALJs and formal
adjudication, the OPM can reinstate selective certification on its own.
recognition of the fact that politics and judicial decision-making may not be wholly
divorced.”).
379 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 880 (noting that in a 1992 ALJ survey 36.8%
of respondents classified their “primary professional experience as private practice”).
380 See Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges, supra note 58, at 114
(discussing eligibility requirements to be placed on candidate register).
381 See id. at 117-18.
382 See Ranier Knopff, The Politics of Reforming Judicial Appointments, 58 U.N.B. L.J.
44, 49 (2008).
383 See Isaac D. Benkin & Jason Schlosberg, Practice in FAA Civil Penalty
Proceedings, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 10, 13 (2006) (noting that one ALJ’s decision is not
binding on colleagues but may prove persuasive).
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The OPM has statutory authority to “prescribe regulations” related to,
among other things, ALJ hiring.384 The agency’s past, longstanding use
of selective certification strongly suggests its propriety, and I am not
aware of any challenge to that authority. Thus, unlike prior proposals
for selective certification, this compromise proposal should largely
address both sides’ concerns.385 OPM, for its part, should gain power
by giving up some selection criteria to certain agencies for certain
adjudications. If agencies increasingly choose ALJs, the OPM gains a
meaningful role in the hiring of more ALJs.
But the return to a modified selective certification is merely a
beginning. Congress and the OPM have too long ignored other
problems with ALJ hiring386 that must be fixed if agencies are to view
OPM-led hiring as a worthwhile price for improved adjudication.
First, Congress should repeal or substantially limit the Veterans’
Preference for ALJ candidates, which significantly increases the odds
of veterans’ inclusion in the list of three candidates from which
agencies must choose.387 As others have noted for decades, it limits
diversity within the ALJ corps and can lead to a less-experienced and
less qualified corps.388 Second, Congress should provide the OPM
more guidance on its responsiveness to agencies’ requests for
additional ALJs and provide a faster hiring process that is more
receptive to agency requests for ALJ hiring. One way to help this is for
the OPM to reopen and adequately staff its ALJ Office, which it closed
in 2003.389 The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference also
has a significant — and self-interested — role to play in
recommending improvements to the ALJ-hiring process to render it
more attractive to agencies, even if these improvements may affect the
perceived prestige of the corps. Ultimately, with the benefits that ALJs
384

5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012).
See, e.g., VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1061-62.
386 See, e.g., 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49 (listing recommendations to ALJhiring and the ALJ-evaluation processes).
387 ALJs and agencies dislike the preference because adding additional points based
on veteran status can significantly affect the final list of candidates. See Lubbers,
Federal Administrative Law Judges, supra note 58, 115-16 (“Since there is only a 20point spread on scores among all ALJ eligibles (from 80 to 100), the addition of 5 to
10 veterans preference points to any score can change by many places an eligible’s
ranking on the register.”).
388 See, e.g., id. (describing how preference (1) substantially impacts eligible
candidates’ ordering because the scores have only a twenty-point range and (2) limits
the number of women candidates).
389 See Arzt et al., supra note 326, at 105-06 (criticizing OPM’s closure of its ALJ
office).
385
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provide, the focus should be on increasing the political pressure for
Congress and the OPM to make these changes, not further limiting the
appointment of ALJs.
CONCLUSION
The time for agencies to reconsider their use of AJs is now. Forty
percent of IJs — one of the most controversial groups of AJs — are
nearing retirement this year.390 The high number of retirements
provides a meaningful opportunity to reconsider the problems with
immigration proceedings and the AJs who oversee these hearings. The
SEC has provided a cautionary tale of the legal and public-relations
fallout that occurs when agencies are caught flat-footed responding to
fairness concerns in their administrative proceedings. Nevertheless,
agencies continue to prefer AJs, as the SSA’s very recent call to transfer
certain administrative appeals from ALJs to AJs demonstrates.391
As agencies move to formal adjudication with ALJs, they further a
collateral virtue. They reduce the “unfortunate balkanization of
hearing procedures [that] defeats the purpose of the drafters of the
APA who wished to achieve greater uniformity and to prescribe basic
fair hearing norms across the federal administrative establishment.”392
This last point is important. Contrary to earlier focus on congressional
action to improve administrative adjudication, this Article has
demonstrated that agencies themselves can help create those fair, more
uniform proceedings in most cases. And this Article demonstrates that
a fair hearing is not only in the interest of regulated parties. It is in
agencies’ interest, too.

390 See Rachel Glickhouse, Immigration Judges Are Burning Out Faster than Prison
Wardens and Hospital Doctors, QZ.COM (Aug. 3, 2015), http://qz.com/469923/thereare-only-250-immigration-judges-in-the-united-states (“But there are only 250
immigration judges in the US, and this year, 100 judges are up for retirement.”).
391 Telephone Interview with Admin. Law Judge William A. Wenzel, Vice President
of Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges (Mar. 17, 2016). The Association of Administrative
Law Judges contends that the SSA’s own regulations require ALJs to preside over these
appeals.
392 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1006 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947)); see also Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note
35, at 892 (“The elimination of any unified concept of a hearing on the record has
resulted in each agency crafting its own adjudicatory procedure ‘good for this day and
train only.’” (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting))).
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APPENDIX A. GRADES GS-15 OR ABOVE

Agency
U.S.
Department of
Labor
Social
Security
Administration
U.S.
Department of
Energy
U.S.
Department of
the
Interior
U.S.
Government
Printing
Office
U.S.
Department of
Agriculture
U.S.
Department of
Defense
U.S.
General
Services
Administration

Office

Number
of
Hearing
Officials

Benefits
Review
Board

5

Appeals
Counsel
Energy
Board of
Contract
Appeals
Board of
Contract
Appeals
Board of
Contract
Appeals

GS, SES
or Other
Pay Plan

2015
Lowest
GS
Level
Basic
Pay

AA

105,900

AA

105,900

25

Title of
Position
Administrative
Appeals
Judge
Administrative
Appeals
Judge

3

Administrative
Judge

CA

149,178

1

Contract
Board
Chair

CA-01

158,700

1

Administrative
Judge

CA-1

149,178

CA-1-3

149,178

Board of
Contract
Appeals
Armed
Services
Board of
Contract
Appeals

4

Administrative
Judge

30

Administrative
Judge

CA-1-3

149,178

Board of
Contract
Appeals

8

Board
Judge

CA-1-3

149,178

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

University of California, Davis
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Agency
U.S.
Department of
Housing
& Urban
Development
U.S.
Department of
Transport
-ation
U.S.
Department of
Veterans
Affairs
U.S.
Department of
the
Interior
U.S.
Occupational
Safety &
Health
Review
Commission
U.S.
Department of
Commerce
U.S.
Department of
Commerce

Office

Board of
Contract
Appeals
Board of
Contract
Appeals
Board of
Contract
Appeals
Board of
Contract
Appeals
Office of
the
Chairman
and Office
of the
Commissioner
Board or
Patent
Appeals
and
Interferences
Board or
Patent
Appeals
and
Interferences
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Number
of
Hearing
Officials

Title of
Position

GS, SES
or Other
Pay Plan

2015
Lowest
GS
Level
Basic
Pay

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

3

Administrative
Judge

CA-1-3

149,178

3

Administrative
Judge

CA-1-3

149,178

6

Administrative
Judge

CA-1-3

149,178

1

Contract
Board
Vice
Chair

CA-02

153,939

3

Member

EX

148,700

20

Legal
Examiner

GS-15

101,630

2,032,600

1,000

Patent
Examiner

GS-15

101,630

101,630,000
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Agency
U.S.
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission
U.S.
Department of
Defense
U.S.
Department of
Defense
Environmental
Protection
Agency
U.S.
Department of
the
Interior
U.S.
Department of
Justice
U.S.
Small
Business
Administration

U.S. Air
Force

Office

Office of
Proceedings
Defense
Legal
Services
Office
Defense
Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Office of
Enforcement and
Compliance
Assurance
Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Drug
Enforcement
Administration
Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Board for
Correction for
Military
Records
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Number
of
Hearing
Officials

Title of
Position

GS, SES
or Other
Pay Plan

2015
Lowest
GS
Level
Basic
Pay

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

2

Judgment
Officer

GS-15

101,630

203,260

17

Administrative
Judge

GS-15

101,630

1,727,710

16

Administrative
Judge

GS-15

101,630

1,626,080

1

Hearing
Officer

GS-15

101,630

101,630

4

Indian
Probate
Judge

GS-15

101,630

406,520

2

Deciding
Official

GS-15

101,630

203,260

2

Administrative
Judge

GS-15

101,630

203,260

70

Panel
Chair
Panel
Member

GS-15
and
Above

101,630

7,114,100
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Agency
U.S.
Department of
Commerce
U.S.
Department of
Education

Office
Trademark
Trial and
Appeals
Board
Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals

U.S.
Department of
Labor

Employee
Compensation
Appeals
Board

U.S.
Department of
Justice

U.S.
Department of
Justice
U.S.
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
Environmental
Protection
Agency

Board of
Immigration
Appeals
Executive
Office for
Immigration
Review/
Office of
the Chief
Immigration Judge
Office of
the
General
Counsel
Office of
Enforcement and
Compliance
Assurance

Number
of
Hearing
Officials

15

Title of
Position
Administrative
Trademark
Judge

19

Administrative
Judge
Chairman
Members
Alternates (4)
Board
MemberAppellant
Immigration
Judge

228

Immigration
Judge

3

7

8

4

Administrative
Judge
Environmental
Appeals
Board
Judge
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GS, SES
or Other
Pay Plan

2015
Lowest
GS
Level
Basic
Pay

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

SES-4
GS-15

101,630

1,524,450

SES-6
GS-15

101,630

304,890

SL
GS-15

101,630

711,410

IJ

109,970

2,089,430

IJ 1-4
Level A:
SES-1-3
Level B:
SES-3
Level C:
SES-4

109,970

25,073,160

121,956

975,648

SES

121,956

487,824
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Agency
U.S.
Department of
Justice
National
Foundation on
the Arts
and
Humanities
U.S.
Department of
Health &
Human
Services
U.S.
Department of
the
Interior
U.S.
Department of
the
Interior

General
Accounting
Office
U.S.
Department of
Commerce
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Number
of
Hearing
Officials

Title of
Position

GS, SES
or Other
Pay Plan

2015
Lowest
GS
Level
Basic
Pay

1

Deputy
Administration

SES

121,956

121,956

National
Endowment for
the
Humanities

1

Chairman

SES

121,956

121,956

Departmental
Appeals
Board

5

Board
Member

SES
SL

121,956

609,780

12

Administrative
Judge

SL-00

121,956

1,463,472

SL-00

121,956

121,956

135,842

8,422,204

Office
Drug
Enforcement
Administration

Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals

Office of
the
General
Counsel
Board or
Patent
Appeals
and
Interferences
Sum of
Hearing
Officials

25

Attorney
Examiner
Senior
Attorney
or
Assistant
General
Counsel
(25-30)

Pay
Banding
(GS-15
Equiv.)

62

Administrative
Patent
Judge

Admn.
Determined

1

1,618

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries
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APPENDIX B. ISOLATED HIGH-PAID AJS

Agency
U.S.
International
Trade
Commission

U.S.
Army
U.S.
Department of
Health &
Human
Services
Pension
Benefit
Guaranty
Corporation
U.S.
Railroad
Retirement
Board

Federal
Maritime
Commission

Office

Office of
the
Secretary
Army
Board
for
Correction for
Military
Records
Food
and
Drug
Administration

Appeals
Board
Bureau
of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Bureau
of
Consumer
Complaints
and
Licensing

Number
of
Hearing
Officials

Title of
Position

GS,
SES
or
Other
Pay
Plan

6

Commissioner

EX
SES
GS

100

Chairperson
Board
Member

GS
SES

2015
Lowest GS
Level Basic
Pay

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

4

Presiding
Officer
(Part
Time)
Appeals
Board
Member
Appeals
Board
Chairman

11

Hearings
Officer

GS12-15

61,486

676,346

3

Settlement
Officer

GM13-15

73,115

219,345

4

SES
GS

SL
GS
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Agency

Department of
the Navy

U.S.
Merit
System
Protection
Board

Environmental
Protection
Agency

U.S.
Department of
Energy

Office
Board of
the
Correction of
Naval
Records

Office of
Regional
Operations
Office of
Enforcement
and
Compliance
Assurance

Office of
Hearings
and
Appeals
Sum of
Hearing
Officials

Number
of
Hearing
Officials

48

62*
5
5

11

19

Title of
Position

BCNR
Board
Member
Administrative
Judge
Chief
Administrative
Judge
(50%)
Regional
Director
(15%)

Regional
Judicial
Officer
SES
Office
Director
Hearing
OfficerAttorney
Examiner

1715

GS,
SES
or
Other
Pay
Plan

2015
Lowest GS
Level Basic
Pay

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

SES
GS-13

73,115

3,509,520

SES
GS13-15

73,115

4,533,130

GS14/15

86,399

950,389

SES
GS14/15

86,399

1,641,581

268

*counted numbers in bold font only, not part-time AJs
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APPENDIX C. ISOLATED LOW-PAID AJS
2015
Lowest
Number
GS
of
GS, SES Level
Hearing Title of or Other Basic
Agency Office Officials Position Pay Plan
Pay
Any
Professional
Employee
of the
U.S.
Regional
National
Offices
Labor Office of can serve
Relathe
as a
Field
tions General Hearing ExaminBoard Counsel Official
er
GS-7-13 34,662
U.S.
Depart- Veterans
ment of Benefits
Veterans AdminiHearing
Affairs stration
244
Officer GS-9-13 42,399
U.S.
Equal
Employ- Field
ment CoordiOppor- nation
tunity
ProAdminiComgrams
strative GS-11mission Division
99
Judge
14
51,298
U.S.
Equal
Employ- Field
ment
CoorOppor- dination
tunity
ProAdminiComgrams 12 (Con- strative GS-11mission Division
tract)
Judge
14
51,298
Any
Professional
Employee
of the
U.S.
Regional
National
Offices
Labor Office of can serve
Relathe
as a
tions General Hearing
GS-11Board Counsel Official Attorney
14
51,298
Office of
Workers
U.S.
ComHearing
Depart- pensaRepment of
tion
resenta- GS-12/
Labor Program
24
tives
13
61,486

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

Cost if
ALJS*

Difference
in Cost if
ALJs

10,345,356 25,839,600 15,494,244

5,078,502 10,484,100 5,405,598

615,576

1,475,664

1,270,800

655,224

2,541,600 1,065,936

Against Administrative Judges

2016]

Agency
U.S.
Railroad
Retirement
Board

Office

Bureau
of Hearings and
Appeals
Bureau
of
Consumer
Federal ComMariplaints
time
and
ComLicensmission
ing
U.S.
Department of National
Agricul- Appeals
ture
Division
Board of
the
CorrecDepart- tion of
ment of Naval
the Navy Records

U.S.
Merit
System Office of
Protec- Regional
tion
OperaBoard
tions
Office of
EnforceEnviment
ronmenand
tal
CompliProtecance
tion
AssurAgency
ance

U.S.
Office of
Depart- Hearment of ings and
Energy Appeals

2015
Lowest
Number
GS
of
GS, SES Level
Hearing Title of or Other Basic
Officials Position Pay Plan
Pay
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Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries

Cost if
ALJS*

Difference
in Cost if
ALJs

11

Hearings
Officer

GS-1215

61,486

676,346

1,164,900

488,554

3

Settlement
Officer

GM-1315

73,115

219,345

317,700

98,355

70

Hearing
Officer

GS-13

48

62*
5 (50%
Time)
5 (15%
Time)

11

19

BCNR
Board
SES
Member GS-13
Administrative
Judge
Chief
Administrative
Judge
SES
Regional GS-13Director
15

Regional
Judicial GS-14/
Officer
15
SES
Office
Director
Hearing
OfficerAttorney
SES
Examin- GS-14/
er
15

73,115 5,118,050

7,413,000 2,294,950

73,115 3,509,520

5,083,200 1,573,680

73,115 4,533,130

6,565,800 2,032,670

86,399

1,164,900

214,511

2,012,100

370,519

950,389

86,399 1,641,581
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Agency

Office
Sum of
hearing
officers
(excluding AJs
in C7
and
C16)

2015
Lowest
Number
GS
of
GS, SES Level
Hearing Title of or Other Basic
Officials Position Pay Plan
Pay

529

(counted
numbers
in bold
font, not
parttime
AJs)

603

*ALJ
Basic
Salary

105,900

Total Cost
based on
2002
Numbers
with 2015
Salaries
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Cost if
ALJS*

Difference
in Cost if
ALJs

34,163,459 63,857,700 29,694,241

